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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to the Utah Supreme Court's Order dated February 22, 1989, and 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988)• 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This suit was brought by Home Savings to recover its 
losses on second mortgage loans which it made to AFCO investors 
from November 1981 to January 1982. Those loans involved Grant 
Affleck's infamous scheme to have people take out second 
mortgages on their homes and to sign over the proceeds to 
AFCO. Home Savings' management directly negotiated with Grant 
Affleck to participate as a lender in the AFCO scheme, and 
Home's management consciously changed lending practices and 
procedures to accommodate Affleck's operation. Nearly seven 
months after the last AFCO investor loan was made, and several 
months after the loans had all gone into default and the AFCO 
investors had sued Home Savings, Home Savings bought a Savings 
& Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form 22, from The Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Company. Home Savings now claims in this action 
that its losses were caused by the dishonest acts of one minor 
employee, a loan solicitor named Larry Glad, and that the 
losses are covered by the fidelity bond issued by Aetna on 
July 14, 1982. 
The trial court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
presiding, made several dispositive rulings before trial which 
reduced the number of issues to be considered by the jury. The 
remaining issues were then tried to a jury over a period of 
four and one-half weeks in the fall of 1987. Prior to 
submitting the case to the jury, the trial court made several 
additional legal rulings further limiting Aetna's defenses that 
the jury could consider. Ultimately, the jury completed a 
Special Verdict form making some findings in plaintiff's 
favor. It also answered Special Interrogatories in defendant's 
favor on several dispositive defenses. The court disregarded 
the Special Interrogatory findings, and entered Judgment for 
plaintiff. 
Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company appeals 
from the following rulings of the trial court: the final 
judgment entered on November 2, 1988, the Minute Entry dated 
May 29, 1987, the Order dated June 5, 1987, the Minute Order 
dated August 19, 1987, the Minute Order dated August 20, 1987, 
the Order and Minute Entry dated August 25, 1987, the Order 
dated September 21, 1987, the court's oral ruling on the record 
denying defendant's Rule 50(a) Motion dated November 10, 1987, 
the Order dated December 21, 1987 denying defendant's Rule 
50(b) Motion, the Memorandum Decision dated March 4, 1988, and 
the Minute Entry dated May 10, 1988. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Issues Requiring Reversal: 
1. The jury found that Home Savings learned of 
its employee's (Larry Glad's) dishonesty in December 1981 
during his employment, before many of the loans were closed, 
and seven months before the Bond was even issued. Does Section 
11 of the Bond, which terminates coverage for an employee as 
soon as the Savings and Loan learns of such dishonesty, 
preclude coverage for loss from Larry Glad's conduct? 
2. Home Savings was sued several times on the 
AFCO investor loans, and the loans were all in default, all 
several months before the Bond was even issued. Did the trial 
court err by concluding as a matter of law that Home 
Savings' discovery of loss occurred after Aetna issued the Bond? 
3. The jury concluded on Special Interrogatories 
Nos. 2 and 4 that Home Savings made misrepresentations and 
nondisclosures in applying for the Aetna Bond. Did the trial 
court err in disregarding those findings and in entering 
judgment against Aetna notwithstanding the jury's responses? 
B. Issues Requiring Remand for Further Proceedings; 
4. In 1986, the Federal District Court for Utah 
found Home Savings liable for primary and secondary violations 
of state and federal securities laws in connection with its 
-3-
loans to AFCO investors. Did this trial court err in failing 
to exclude the losses on the AFCO loans from bond coverage by 
virtue of the Bond's trading exclusion rider? 
5. Two of Aetna's key trial defenses were that 
Home Savings exercised bad business judgment in entering into 
the arrangement with Grant Affleck and that Home Savings 
subsequently mismanaged the AFCO investor loans by failing to 
follow safe, sound lending procedures and its own policies. 
Did the trial court err by precluding the jury's consideration 
of these defenses as a cause of Home Savings' losses and by 
failing to allow the jury to make an allocation of causation 
between bad business judgment and mismanagement, on the one 
hand, and the conduct of Larry Glad, on the other? 
6. Did the trial court err by failing to require 
plaintiff to join as an indispensable party its prior fidelity 
insurer, Fidelity and Deposit of Maryland, which covered Home 
Savings under an identical Savings & Loan Blanket Bond, 
Standard Form 22, which was in place during the relevant events 
in 1981 and up until June 21, 1982? 
C. Issues Requiring Reduction of Damages: 
7. Did the trial court err in ruling that the 
amount of Home Savings' losses should not be offset by the 
amount of money Home Savings recouped directly from the AFCO 
investor loan proceeds? 
8. The Bond only indemnifies the insured for 
defense costs related to claims which, if proven, would 
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constitute covered losses. Did the trial court err in awarding 
as part of the damages in this case the plaintiffs1 attorneys1 
fees in the suit filed by the AFCO investors against Home 
Savings and the full amount of attorney's fees and costs 
incurred by Home Savings in defending state and federal 
securities laws claims and the truth-in-lending claims in that 
lawsuit? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Under Point III, the Appellate Court's application of 
U.C.A. § 31-19-8(1) (1974) pertaining to applications for 
insurance would be dispositive of the entire case if this Court 
upholds the jury's determination that Home Savings acquired the 
Aetna Bond through material misrepresentations or omissions, 
and that Aetna would not have issued the Bond if it had known 
of the misrepresented or omitted facts. 
-5-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Action. 
The central dispute in this lawsuit involves a 
Savings and Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form 22. The Bond 
provides coverage for losses resulting from employee dishonesty 
sustained at any time but "discovered" during the Bond 
period. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ("Aetna") 
issued the Bond to Home Savings and Loan Association ("Home 
Savings") effective beginning June 21, 1982. In 1986 in the 
case of Armitage v. Home Savings, a predecessor action, the 
Federal District Court for Utah entered judgment pursuant to 
jury verdicts against Home Savings for $1.4 million as a result 
of Home Savings1 state and federal securities law violations, 
coitimon law fraud, and truth-in-lending violations, all of which 
Home committed from November 1981 to January 1982. Home 
Savings knew of the facts that ultimately gave rise to the loss 
from information it obtained from December 1981 to June 4, 
1982. In addition, numerous lawsuits were filed against Home 
Savings by AFCO investors in March, April, and May 1982, before 
the Bond was issued. Nevertheless, Home Savings then filed 
this action to obtain indemnification from Aetna against the 
claims of those AFCO investors which were established in the 
Armitage judgment. 
-6-
II. Course of Proceedings, and Trial Court Disposition, 
Home Savings1 Amended Complaint alleged that it 
suffered losses on second mortgage loans to AFCO investors 
because of the dishonesty of one of its employees, Larry Glad. 
Aetna answered that if Larry Glad's dishonesty were the 
effective cause of the Armitage verdict, then Home Savings 
had learned of the dishonesty and had discovered its loss prior 
to the period of Aetna's Bond. Section 11 of the Bond provides 
for termination of coverage as to any employee as soon as an 
employer learns of that employee's dishonesty. The Bond also 
provides that "discovery of loss" occurs when the insured 
actually learns of a loss or of facts that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that a loss might result or when 
it is put on notice by a third party of a claim which would 
constitute a covered loss. 
In the alternative, Aetna argued that Home's employee 
had not been "dishonest," as specifically defined by the Bond, 
because he lacked "manifest intent to cause [Home Savings] to 
sustain" a loss on the AFCO investor loans. In addition, Aetna 
argued both that the Bond specifically excluded coverage for 
losses from trading in the AFCO securities, and that the losses 
in Armitage were caused by the bad business judgment and 
mismanagement of Home Savings' officers and directors, rather 
than the conduct of one minor employee. 
A series of pretrial, trial and post-trial motions 
were made by both parties. The trial court ruled against Aetna 
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on every significant issue. Most notably, before trial the 
court ruled as a matter of law that because Home Savings did 
not "sustain" a loss until February 1986 when the Armitage 
judgment was entered, that it could not have "discovered" its 
loss prior to that time, despite the Bond's reasonable person 
and per se standards of discovery, and in spite of 
considerable evidence that Home Savings actually learned of an 
impending loss before buying the Aetna Bond. 
A four and one-half week jury trial of this case was 
conducted in October and November, 1987 before the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, Third Judicial District Court. Before 
submitting the case to the jury, the trial court determined 
that it would not allow Aetna to refuse coverage under 
Section 11 of the Bond even though Home Savings learned of 
Larry Glad's dishonesty many months before purchasing the Aetna 
Bond. In addition, and in spite of substantial evidence 
presented by Aetna, the court refused to allow the jury to 
consider Aetna's primary factual defense that Home Savings' 
loss was caused not by employee dishonesty, but by the 
mismanagement and the bad business judgment of its officers and 
directors. Finally, although the jury made dispositive 
findings in Aetna's favor in response to certain Special 
Interrogatories, the trial court entered judgment against Aetna 
on November 2, 1988 in the amount of $1,977,505.73, plus court 
costs of $3,751.75, and prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$2,915.08. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Home Savings' Loans Made to AFCO Investors. 
1. From mid-November, 1981 through the first 
week of January, 1982, Home Savings made a total of 42 second 
mortgage loans to individuals ("AFCO investors") who 
invested the proceeds in several interrelated companies 
("AFCO") owned and/or controlled by Grant C. Affleck. The 
loans were secured by second trust deeds on the investors' 
homes. (See Stipulated Pretrial Order, Uncontroverted Facts, 
R. at 727; and Jury Instruction No. 15, R. at 1313.) (Copies 
of the Stipulated Pretrial Order and of selected Jury 
Instructions are included at Document Addenda A and B, 
respectively, to Aetna's Appellant's Brief.) 
B. Home Savings Learns of Employee Dishonesty and Discovers 
Losses on the AFCO Investor Loans. 
2. Throughout the three months of AFCO investor 
lending activity in 1981, and during the first half of 1982, 
before Home Savings purchased the Bond from Aetna on July 14, 
1982, Home Savings' officers and directors learned of a number 
of significant facts about the conduct of its employee, Larry 
Glad, about Grant Affleck and his AFCO businesses, and about 
irregularities and pending losses on the AFCO investor loans. 
Those facts and when Home Savings learned of them, are as 
follows: 
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a. Prior to granting a $100,000 loan to AFCO 
Enterprises on November 10, 1981, Home Savings had in 
its possession a credit report on AFCO Enterprises 
which showed a foreclosure proceeding against AFCO by 
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan, an unsatisfactory 
record on AFCO's business checking account, slow 
payment by AFCO to its creditors, and unverifiable 
assets and income. (Tr. Ex. 13; F. Smolka testimony 
[test.] at 2919.19, .163-.167.) 
b. Home Savings learned in approximately 
mid-December 1981 that Larry Glad had engaged in 
dishonest and fraudulent acts unrelated to the AFCO 
investor loans. (Jury Special Interrogatories Nos. 5 
through 8, R. at 1353-54.) (Copies of the Jury 
Special Verdict and Jury Special Interrogatories are 
included as Document Addenda C and D, respectively, 
of Aetna's Appellant's Brief.) 
c. On December 20, 1981, Home Savings learned 
that in November 1981 Larry Glad had received $15,000 
directly from AFCO for his handling of the investor 
loans. (Pretrial Order, Stipulated Facts, R. at 6; 
Jury Instruction No. 15, R. at 1313; W. Cox test., R. 
at 2905.83-.85.) As a result, Home Savings fired 
Larry Glad on December 29, 1981. (R. at 154.2; F. 
Smolka test. R. at 2919.37.) 
d. On or about February 26, 1982, Fred Smolka 
received a letter from Grant Affleck advising Home 
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Savings of two major irregularities in the investor 
loans: (i) back-dating of documents affecting the 
borrower's right of rescission under federal 
truth-in-lending laws; and (ii) closing of loans 
outside of Home Savings' offices and without the 
required presence of Home Savings' representative. 
(Trial Exhibit [Tr. Ex.] 20; H. Bradshaw test., R. at 
2907.110-.112; F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.50-.52.) 
(A copy of Affleck's letter is included at Tab 20 of 
Aetna's Exhibit Addendum.) Affleck's February 26, 
1982 letter also came to the personal attention of 
Home Savings' President, Howard Bradshaw. (H. 
Bradshaw test., R. at 2907.110-.112.) 
e. In January 1982, contrary to its policy only 
to accept payment on a loan from the individual 
borrower, Home Savings accepted a $10,549.85 check 
from AFCO to be applied on the first monthly payment 
due on the investor loans. The check was not honored 
because of AFCO's insufficient funds. (Tr. Ex. 81; 
Fred Smolka test., R. at 2919.47-.49.) (A copy of 
the check is included at Tab 18 of Aetna's Exhibit 
Addendum.) 
f. By February 28, 1982, the AFCO investor loans 
began showing delinquencies. (F. Smolka test., R. at 
2919.55.) 
g. On March 8, 1982, the AFCO companies filed 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions in the United States 
-11-
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Utah. 
(See Pretrial Order, Incontroverted Facts; R. at 724; 
R. at 2962-2967.) 
h. Between the AFCO bankruptcy filing and the 
date of the Bond (June 21, 1982), Salt Lake's two 
major newspapers reported on the AFCO bankruptcy and 
the financial collapse of Grant Affleck's real estate 
empire no fewer than 31 times. (R. at pp. 2969-95.) 
Fred Smolka, then Executive Vice President of Home 
Savings, was aware of and familiar with the local 
newspaper reports about AFCO's precarious financial 
circumstances. (F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.54, 
2920.33.) 
i. At Home Savings' March 17, 1982 Board of 
Directors Meeting, "Wallace Woodbury, Legal Counsel, 
reported the status of second mortgage loans referred 
by AFCO in light of AFCO's bankruptcy. Counsel 
report[ed] that Home's position should be sound based 
on documentation of the loans." (Tr. Ex. Ill; a copy 
of Minutes of Home Savings' Board of Directors is 
included at Tab 111 of Exhibit Addendum.) 
j. On April 7, 1982, Howard Bradshaw, then 
President of Home Savings, communicated with First 
Federal Savings & Loan in Great Falls, Montana (one 
of the purchasers of Home Savings' private placement 
of second mortgage AFCO investor loans), regarding 
AFCO's "extreme cash flow problem," AFCO's "obvious 
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inability to live up to [its] promise," and the 
impact which those difficulties were having upon Home 
Savings1 collection of monthly payments from AFCO 
investors. (R. at 3005; Tr. Ex. 53, included at 
Tab 53 of Exhibit Addendum.) By April 1982, the AFCO 
investor loans were in default and Home Savings had 
sent demands or instituted foreclosure actions to 
enforce the loans against the investors. (H. 
Bradshaw test., R. at 2907.122-.123; 2907.138-.139.) 
k. In March and April, 1982, still months before 
the purchase of the Aetna Bond, three separate 
lawsuits were filed by AFCO investors and served on 
Home Savings (Pretrial Order, Uncontested Facts, 
para. 11, R. at 725), alleging fraud, lending 
irregularities, and securities violations. (Tr. Exs. 
356, 357, 358, 359, and 360.) After various pretrial 
maneuverings and proceedings, the largest of those 
cases became the Armitage v. Home Savings case in 
which judgment was entered against Home Savings. 
1. In March and April 1982, Home Savings 
received at least three letters from attorneys for 
AFCO investors. The letters notified Home Savings of 
numerous, serious irregularities in the processing 
and closing of the AFCO investor loans. (F. Smolka 
test., R. at 2920.39-.40; Tr. Exs. 113, 114, and 
115.) Those letters set forth the exact 
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irregularities which later formed the basis of the 
judgment in Armitage. (Id*) 
m. On June 4, 1982, approximately six weeks 
before Home Savings purchased the Bond from Aetna, 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), the 
federal agency which supervised Home Savings, 
completed its report of an annual examination of Home 
Savings and submitted a Report of Examination, (Tr. 
Ex. 196; a copy of the FHLBB Examination Report is 
included at Tab 196 of the Exhibit Addendum.) Home 
Savings had immediate access to that Report. 
n. The FHLBB found multiple irregularities in 
Home Savings' lending practices, specifically citing 
the AFCO investor loans. The FHLBB also reported loan 
defaults, lawsuits and indications of lending 
irregularities from Home Savings1 own files. The 
FHLBB concluded that Home Savings1 management had 
subjected Home Savings to possible losses on the AFCO 
investor loans, noting that Home Savings had already 
scheduled $888,998 on 41 investor loans as delinquent 
with risk of potential loss, and it had established a 
bad debt reserve on these loans. (Tr. Ex. 196; 
Elaine Weis test., R. at 2909.111-.114.) 
C. Existing Bond During the Loan Closings and Discovery of 
Loss. 
3. Throughout the period from November 1981 
through June 21, 1982, Home Savings had $900,000 of fidelity 
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bond coverage under a Standard Form 22 which was identical to 
Aetna's Bond, but which had been issued by Fidelity and Deposit 
Company of Maryland ("F&D"). (Depo. Ex. 116; D. Bradshaw 
test., R. at 2906.24-.26.) (A copy of F&D's bond is included 
at Tab 116 of Aetna's Exhibit Addendum.) Like Aetna's Bond, 
F&D's bond was a discovery-type policy which covered "loss 
sustained at any time but discovered during the Bond period. 
D. Aetna's New Fidelity Bond. 
4. In applying for the Aetna Bond, Home Savings 
did not disclose any of its knowledge or any information about 
suits alleging irregularities in and problems with the AFCO 
investor loans. (Tr. Ex. 122.) 
5. On July 14, 1982, Aetna issued to Home 
Savings $1,135,000 of coverage under a Savings and Loan Blanket 
Bond, Standard Form 22 (the "Bond"). (Exhibit A to Home 
Savings' Amended Complaint; Tr. Ex. 343 included at Tab 343 of 
Exhibit Addendum.) Aetna's Bond was made retroactively 
effective to June 21, 1982, the date F&D's prior coverage was 
due to expire. 
E. Terms and Coverage Under the Bond. 
6. The Bond contained basic employee fidelity 
coverage, which provided that Aetna would "indemnify and 
hold harmless" Home Savings for "loss resulting directly from 
one or more dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee, 
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committed anywhere and whether committed alone or in collusion 
with others . . . ." (Insuring Agreement (A), Tr. Ex. 343.) 
7. The Bond did not cover losses resulting from 
the voluntary or intentional decisions or acts of Home Savings1 
officers and directors in the course of its business. Losses 
sustained as a result of mismanagement and bad business 
judgment were not covered. 
8. As stated in the preamble to the Bond, it 
provided coverage only "with respect to loss sustained by the 
insured at any time but discovered during the Bond 
Period. . . . " (Tr. Ex. 343, p. 3) (emphasis added.) 
9. In the "Conditions and Limitations" portion 
of the Bond, Section 11 specifically terminated coverage for an 
employee such as Larry Glad "as soon as the Insured shall learn 
of any dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of such 
Employee . . . ." (Tr. Ex. 343, p. 5.) This same limitation 
was contained in the F&D bond. (Depo. Ex. 116, p. 5.) 
10. A Rider to the Bond on form SR 6091 provides 
that the insured's "discovery" of loss occurs objectively when 
the insured learned of "facts which would cause a reasonable 
person to assume a loss . . . has been or will be incurred." 
(Tr. Ex. 343, p. 25.) Rider 6091 also established per se 
discovery of loss when the insured received "notice . . . of an 
actual or potential claim by a third party . . . which, if 
true, would create a loss under the bond." Id. 
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11. Another Rider on form SR 6030a excludes from 
coverage any loss resulting directly or indirectly from trading 
in securities. (Tr. Ex. 343, p. 22.) 
12. The General Agreements section of the Bond 
obligates Aetna to indemnify Home Savings only for Court Costs 
and Attorney's Fees "incurred and paid by the Insured in 
defending any suit or legal proceeding — which, if established 
against the Insured, would constitute a valid and collectible 
loss . . . under the terms of this bond." (Tr. Ex. 343, 
p. 3.) Costs for defending any claim (i.e., securities law 
violations) outside the coverage of the Bond are not 
reimbursable. 
F. Subsequent Developments After Aetna's Bond was Issued. 
13. On December 9 and 21, 1982, Home Savings 
finally notified Aetna and F&D of the possibility of a loss 
covered by the Bond from the pending cases, including Armitage 
v. Home Savings. (Tr. Exs. 119 and 120; copies of notices to 
Aetna included at Tabs 119 and 120 of Exhibit Addendum.) 
14. On September 30, 1983, Aetna elected not to 
assume defense of the Armitage litigation because the claim 
fell outside the coverage of the bond. (Tr. Ex. 140.) F&D 
also issued a denial of coverage for independent reasons. 
15. On August 14, 1984, the Armitage jury 
rendered Special Verdicts against Home Savings, finding it 
liable in each of 36 AFCO investor loans for three primary 
violations of state and federal securities fraud provisions. 
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(A copy of the Armitage Special Verdict is included at 
Document Addendum E, R. at 210.70-.76.) In addition, the jury 
found Home Savings secondarily liable on the 3 6 AFCO investor 
loans both for controlling and for aiding and abetting 
violations by Grant Affleck and/or AFCO of § 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder. Id. The Armitage jury also found Home Savings 
liable for common law fraud, and for violations of federal 
Truth-in-Lending regulations. Id. 
16. A Final Judgment in the Armitage case was 
entered on February 24, 1986. (Exhibit B to Home Savings1 
Amended Complaint; Tr. Ex. 33 0.) (A copy of the Armitage 
judgment is included at Tab 330 of Aetna's Exhibit Addendum.) 
The Armitage judgment rescinded the AFCO investor promissory 
notes and trust deeds resulting in a net principal loss to Home 
Savings of $998,623 and included $10,000 of punitive damages. 
17. The Armitage court also entered a Judgment 
for Attorney's Fees against Home Savings on August 24, 1986, in 
the amount of $381,294. The Judgment for Attorneys Fees was 
later negotiated down to $190,647. (See Pretrial Order, 
Uncontroverted Facts, paras. 22-24; Document Addendum A; R. at 
727-28.) 
G. The Present Lawsuit. 
18. Home Savings filed its Amended Complaint in 
the present action against Aetna on April 21, 1986. (R. at 
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13-24.) In filing the action, Home claimed that the losses it 
suffered in the Armitage case were wholly caused by the 
dishonest acts of its employee Larry Glad, and that those 
losses are covered by the employee fidelity bond issued by 
Aetna. Although Home Savings1 key officers directly negotiated 
with Grant Affleck and entered into agreements with him 
regarding the AFCO investor loans; although Home Savings1 Board 
of Directors specifically approved participation in the AFCO 
second mortgages; and although Home Savings' officers 
consciously approved, initiated, or allowed extraordinary 
lending procedures with regard to the AFCO investor loans: 
Home Savings alleged that its loan solicitor, Larry Glad, 
caused the Armitage verdict to be entered against it. 
(Amended Complaint, para. 15, R. at 20; Pretrial Order, 
Plaintiff's Claims, R. at 720-21.) 
19. The alleged misconduct of Larry Glad falls 
into three distinct categories: 
a. The receipt by Larry Glad in November 
1981 of a $15,000 kickback from AFCO; 
b. The alleged withholding by Larry Glad of 
his personal knowledge about AFCO's 
precarious financial circumstances; and 
c. Larry Glad's participation in and 
purported control of irregularities in the 
processing and closing of loans made to AFCO 
investors. 
(Amended Complaint, para. 9, R. at 16-19.) 
20. As shown in paragraph 2, above, Home Savings 
clearly learned of Glad's kickback, of the financial 
instability of AFCO, and of egregious irregularities in the 
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AFCO investor loans many months before it applied for and was 
issued the Aetna Bond. 
21. At trial, the jury found that Home Savings 
learned of Larry Glad's dishonesty or fraud fully seven months 
before the Aetna Bond was purchased. (Special Interrogatory 
No. 8, R. at 1354; copy at Document Addendum D.) Furthermore, 
Larry Glad was fired by Home Savings within approximately one 
week of such discovery. (F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.37.) 
22. In addition, the jury found that Home Savings 
made misrepresentations and nondisclosures of material facts to 
Aetna, and also failed to volunteer material information, which 
if disclosed would have resulted in Aetna's refusing to issue 
the Bond or excluding that risk from coverage. (Special 
Interrogatories 2 and 4, R. at 1353-1353; see Aetna's Document 
Addendum D.) 
Additional facts pertinent to the separate issues 
involved in this appeal, particularly details of Home Savings1 
bad business judgment and mismanagement, are contained below in 
the specific sections discussing each of those issues. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Given the compelling facts of this case, it would be 
both inequitable and contrary to any reasonable 
interpretation of the Bond, to require Aetna to indemnify Home 
Savings for its loss. This appeal involves primarily issues of 
coverage definitions and matters relating to the timing in Home 
Savings1 acquisition of the Bond. 
POINT I. SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE FOR LOSS 
FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT BECAUSE HOME SAVINGS LEARNED OF HIS 
DISHONESTY DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT, BEFORE MANY OF THE LOANS 
CLOSED, AND SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE BOND WAS PURCHASED. 
Section 11 of the bond provides for coverage to be 
automatically terminated as to any specific employee as soon as 
the insured learns of any dishonest or fraudulent act on 
his part. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that 
Section 11 could not apply because it would make coverage for 
loss from Glad's conduct void at the inception of the bond 
period. However, to preserve factual findings on this point 
for appeal, the jury answered special interrogatories, finding 
that Home Savings learned of dishonest or fraudulent acts on 
Larry Glad's part prior to his termination from employment at 
Home Savings; that the dishonesty did not relate directly to 
the AFCO investor loans; and that such knowledge was acquired 
in approximately mid-December, 1981, seven months before the 
Aetna Bond was issued. Based upon the jury's answers, Aetna 
prevailed on the Section 11 issue. The judgment should be 
reversed. 
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POINT II. HOME SAVINGS IS NOT COVERED UNDER AETNA'S FIDELITY 
BOND FOR ANY LOSS CAUSED BY LARRY GLAD BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
DISCOVERED ITS LOSS PRIOR TO THE PERIOD OF THE BOND. 
The Bond is a "discovery" type bond. A claim is 
covered only if, during the period of the bond, the insured 
employer learns of the likelihood of loss from an employee's 
infidelity. Discovery can occur objectively, when the 
insured itself learns of facts which would cause a reasonable 
person to assume a loss has or will occur; or discovery can 
be per se, when the employer receives notice from third 
parties of actual or potential claims which would be covered 
by the Bond. Under both the objective and per se standards 
of discovery, Home Savings "discovered" its loss between 
December 1981 and no later than the FHLBB Examination Report on 
June 4, 1982, before it purchased the Bond from Aetna. 
The trial court's use of the date of the Armitage 
judgment as the date of Home Savings' "discovery of a loss 
sustained" as a matter of law, was an incorrect ruling. The 
date a monetary loss actually occurs is irrelevant to the 
coverage determination. Because Home Savings discovered its 
loss prior to the Bond's period, there is no coverage for loss 
from the AFCO investor loans, and the judgment should be 
reversed. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE JURY'S 
RESPONSES ON SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 AND ENTERING 
A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY'S RESPONSES. 
In reaching its verdict, the jury found that Home 
Savings made "unintentional misrepresentations or 
nondisclosures of facts . . . which materially affected 
[Aetna's] risks under the Bond, and that [Aetna] would not have 
issued the bond or would have excluded the risk if it had known 
these facts." However, the trial court concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to support those findings, and set 
the jury's decision aside. It was factual error to set aside 
the jury's finding after it had heard four and one-half weeks 
of evidence and specifically decided these issues in Aetna's 
favor. On the issue of disclosing information not requested on 
the application form, the trial court incorrectly held that 
there was a legal duty to volunteer information only if there 
was an intentional or fraudulent concealment of unrequested 
information. The Bond should be declared void, at least as to 
the AFCO investor loan losses which are directly related to 
those material misrepresentations and omissions. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED HOME SAVINGS 
TO RECOVER UNDER AETNA'S BOND THOSE LOSSES FROM THE AFCO 
INVESTOR LOANS WHICH RESULTED FROM HOME'S VIOLATIONS OF STATE 
AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS. 
Rider 6030a of the Bond specifically excludes 
coverage for losses resulting from trading directly or 
indirectly in securities. In the Armitage case, Home Savings 
was held liable for three counts of its own primary violations 
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of state and federal securities laws, and for two counts of 
controlling and of aiding and abetting Grant Affleck in his 
violations of securities laws. The trial court construed 
Rider 603 0a right out of the Bond by concluding that what was 
decided in Armitage did not constitute "trading" and so the 
exclusion didn't apply. This legal ruling should be reversed, 
and the case should be remanded for amendment of the judgment 
to exclude losses stemming from Home Savings' securities law 
violations. 
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY TO 
CONSIDER THE BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT OF HOME 
SAVINGS' OFFICERS AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS THE CAUSE OF HOME 
SAVINGS' LOSS. 
The trial court committed reversible error by: (1) 
refusing to read to the jury a number of key instructions 
setting forth Aetna's theory on causation, (2) giving the jury 
instructions that inadequately presented Aetna's defense, and 
(3) submitting a special verdict to the jury which wholly 
failed to mention Home Savings officers' and directors' actions 
as being the cause of Home Savings' loss. 
The cumulative result of these errors was that the 
jury was never allowed to consider Aetna's chief factual 
defense of bad business judgment and mismanagement as a 
separate, distinct cause of Home Savings' loss. Although 
substantial testimony was introduced on this point, the court 
refused to instruct the jury that mismanagement and bad 
business judgment could be a cause of loss, distinct from 
employee dishonesty; and the jury wasn't allowed to apportion 
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the losses between Larry Glad's misconduct and the significant 
follies of Home Savings' management. The case should be 
remanded for an apportionment of cause between Larry Glad, on 
the one hand, and Home Savings' institutional mismanagement and 
bad business judgment, on the other hand. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR BY FAILING TO 
REQUIRE HOME SAVINGS TO JOIN ITS PRIOR FIDELITY BOND INSURER, 
F&D OF MARYLAND, AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
Aetna moved early in the case to have the issuer of 
Home Savings' prior fidelity bond, Fidelity & Deposit of 
Maryland, joined as an indispensable party under Rule 19, 
U.R.Civ.P. This was necessitated both by the interrelated 
terms of the two bonds, and by the timing of Home Savings' 
discovery of its loss during F&D's policy period. The trial 
court ruled as a matter of law that F&D was not a necessary 
party to a full and fair adjudication of the issues between 
Aetna and Home Savings, and denied Aetna's motion. That ruling 
was in error because the structure of the two discovery bonds 
is intentionally sequential so that fidelity coverage can 
continue from policy to policy and insurer to insurer without 
either overlap or gaps. Two of Aetna's key defenses involved 
the effect of Home Savings' discovery of its loss and its 
knowledge of its employee's dishonesty, both of which occurred 
during F&D's bond period. 
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POINT VII. PROPER CALCULATION OF HOME SAVINGS' LOSSES 
REQUIRES AN OFFSET FOR FUNDS WHICH HOME SAVINGS COLLECTED 
DIRECTLY FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE AFCO INVESTOR LOANS. 
As Home Savings made loans to the AFCO investors, 
some of those loan proceeds were endorsed back to Home 
Savings. Home Savings received $237,760.77 in this manner. 
Those funds were used by Home Savings for its own benefit. 
Therefore, the principal of Home Savings' total damages should 
be reduced by $237,760.77. 
POINT VIII. HOME SAVINGS IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION 
FOR THE LEGAL FEES AWARDED TO THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS NOR THE 
ENTIRE AMOUNT OF COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION. 
Plaintiff's attorneys' fees in the Armitage lawsuit 
were awarded against Home Savings as part of the Armitage 
verdict, but were ultimately negotiated to $190,647.31. The 
claims giving rise to the award of attorneys' fees were for 
violations in the sale or exchange of securities, a risk 
specifically excluded under the Trading Rider of the Bond. 
Because such losses are excluded from coverage, Aetna had no 
obligation to reimburse Home Savings for those fees. As to 
attorneys' fees incurred by Home Savings in defending the 
Armitage litigation (the stipulated amount of such fees being 
$437,500.00), Aetna had no obligation to defend Home Savings in 
the Armitage litigation because Aetna owed no coverage to 
Home Savings for losses discovered outside the Bond's period or 
losses sustained as a result of trading in securities. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION: APPLICABLE PRECEPTS OF INSURANCE LAW 
A number of the issues in this case involve the 
interpretation and application of the Bond as a policy of 
insurance. An overview of the law in this area will be helpful 
at the outset. 
A. A Bond is a Contract Subject to a Fixed Standard of 
Interpretation. 
"[T]he bond cannot be extended by implication or 
enlarged by construction beyond the actual terms of the 
agreement entered into by the parties." Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 426 F.2d 729, 736 
(5th Cir. 1970). "Ambiguity must appear upon the bond or 
policy and cannot be read into it by a strained interpretation 
in order to permit recovery." 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fidelity Bonds 
and Insurance § 3, p. 505 (1988). The consensus of case law 
also provides that "[a] fidelity bond may validly limit the 
liability of the insurer on such bond to losses discovered 
within a specified term." 13 Couch on Insurance 2d, 
§ 46.191 (1982 Ed.). 
A provision of a fidelity bond which 
clearly limits the liability of the insurer 
to losses discovered within a certain 
specified period must be enforced according 
to its terms, so that there can be no 
recovery on a fidelity bond if the loss is 
not discovered within the time specified 
therein. 
Id. 
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B. Policy Riders are an Integral Part of the Contract of 
Insurance. 
Aetna's Bond has several significant riders attached 
to it. Riders to insurance policies constitute an integral 
part of the contract of insurance. 1 Couch on Insurance 2d, 
§ 4:27 p. 386 (1984). This is true even if the rider adds a 
new and different meaning to the original contract. Id. at 
386-87. 
Standard policy laws sometimes expressly 
authorize the attachment of slips or riders 
to contracts of insurance in a form 
provided thereby, so as to modify the 
provisions in the body of the policy; and 
where such a rider is properly attached, 
pursuant to such provision, it forms a part 
of the contract and supersedes the original 
provisions to which it applies. 
1 Couch on Insurance 2d § 4:29, p. 391 (1984). 
The Declarations page of Aetna's Bond at Item 4, 
specifically states that "the liability of the underwriter is 
subject to the terms" of various riders. Thus, the terms of 
its Riders form an integral part of the Bond. When rider terms 
are specific, as contrasted with general provisions of the 
policy, they govern the meaning of the bond. 1 Couch on 
Insurance 2d, § 4:28, p. 389-91 (1984). 
C. The Trial Court's Legal Interpretation of an Insurance 
Policy is Subject to de Novo Review. 
Bonds and insurance policies are contracts, and so 
"the trial court's interpretation [is entitled to] no 
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presumption of correctness." Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. 
Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 935 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), citing Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. National Am. 
Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). Therefore, the 
trial court's rulings as a matter of law on the meaning and 
application of the Aetna Bond are subject to de novo review 
by the appellate court. Allstate Enterprise, Inc. v. 
Heriford, 772 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
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POINT I 
SECTION 11 OF THE BOND PRECLUDES COVERAGE 
FOR LOSS FROM LARRY GLAD'S CONDUCT BECAUSE HOME SAVINGS 
LEARNED OF HIS DISHONESTY DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT, 
BEFORE MANY OF THE LOANS CLOSED, AND SEVEN 
MONTHS BEFORE THE BOND WAS PURCHASED 
A. The Language of Section 11 and its Proper Application. 
Section 11 of the Aetna Bond prevented coverage from 
ever going into effect as to Larry Glad, because the Bond 
was written to reflect the bonding company's intent not to 
accept risk of loss related to any employee previously 
known to the Savings and Loan as dishonest. With regard to 
an employee already known to be dishonest, coverage is void 
from the inception of the policy, i.e., it is void ab 
initio. Section 11 of the Bond provides in part: 
This bond shall be deemed terminated or 
cancelled as to any Employee - (a) as soon 
as the Insured shall learn of any dishonest 
or fraudulent act on the part of such 
Employee . . . . 
(Tr. Ex. 343, copy included at Exhibit Addendum Tab 343.) 
However, the trial court refused to enforce 
Section 11 of the Bond as a matter of law. (See R. 
at 2909.10; 2909.34-.35.) The trial court said Section 11 
seems "baffling and inconsistent" and would permit the bonding 
company to "take premiums for not insuring people." (R. at 
2906.27-.29.) Nevertheless, in response to Special 
Interrogatories Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8, which were submitted to 
the jury solely to preserve its factual determination on this 
point, the jury in this case found: (5) Home Savings learned 
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of a dishonest or fraudulent act on the part of Larry Glad 
prior to December 29, 1981 (the date when he was terminated 
from employment at Home Savings and six and one-half months 
before the Bond was purchased); (6) the dishonest or fraudulent 
act occurred after Larry Glad became employed by Home Savings; 
(7) the dishonest or fraudulent act was not related to the AFCO 
investor loans; and (8) Home Savings first learned of such 
dishonest or fraudulent act about mid-December, 1981. (See 
Jury's Answers to Special Interrogatories 5-8, R. at 1351-1354; 
copy included at Document Addendum D.) The Bond, of course, 
was not even purchased until July 14, 1982, seven months later. 
Section 11 of the Bond protects the bonding company 
from coverage exposure after the insured learns that an 
employee is dishonest. Once an employer is on notice of a 
dishonest employee, the insurance company cannot be required to 
indemnify losses resulting from similar subsequent conduct by 
that same employee. Likewise, an employer cannot lure a new 
bonding company not previously involved in insuring a known 
dishonest employee into writing a bond to cover that employee, 
especially if the Savings and Loan knows that employee to have 
been involved in possible losses and has not disclosed that 
information to the bonding company. Yet, that is exactly what 
the trial court sanctioned with its ruling on Section 11 of the 
Aetna Bond. 
If there were any fidelity coverage for losses 
resulting from Larry Glad's conduct, then it should have been 
under F&D's bond (see Depo. Ex. 116 in Exhibit Addendum), which 
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was in place when Larry Glad's conduct occurred, when Home 
Savings learned of his conduct, and when Home Savings began 
experiencing actual losses and lawsuits regarding loans in 
which Larry Glad was involved. It is unconscionable to permit 
Home Savings to pass its losses on to Aetna, when it should 
have protected its position and preserved its rights under the 
F&D bond by simply giving notice to F&D when the dishonesty of 
Larry Glad was discovered, or at the very latest in March and 
April 1982, when the AFCO investors refused to make their 
payments and initiated litigation. 
B. The Law of Section 11. 
Aetna's position is nearly identical to the situation 
presented in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Central 
Bank of Houston, 672 S.W. 2d 641 (Tex. App. 1984). In that 
case, a bank sought fidelity bond coverage for loan losses that 
resulted from the dishonest acts of its former president, 
Joseph P. DeLorenzo. That bond included a Section 11 identical 
to Section 11 of the Aetna Bond. The only factual difference 
between the two cases is that the bond under which Central Bank 
of Houston sought fidelity coverage was a renewal of a prior 
bond with that same insurer, F&C of New York. In contrast, the 
Aetna Bond was entirely new coverage which was issued to 
replace an F&D of Maryland Bond scheduled to expire on June 21, 
1982, three weeks before Home Savings purchased coverage from 
Aetna. 
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Nevertheless, the jury in Central Bank found and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed that the directors of the bank 
had learned of other acts of dishonesty on the part of Central 
Bank's president prior to the effective date of the renewal 
bond. Based upon that finding, the Texas Court of Appeals held 
that "upon learning of those acts, coverage as to Defendant 
DeLorenzo immediately terminated." Id. at 646. That court 
held: 
The jury's answer to special issue sixteen 
did not absolve appellant of liability for 
losses occurring after October, 1974 
because the renewal bond which was issued 
December 11, 1974, was void from its 
inception. Rather, appellant is absolved 
of liability for these losses because a 
renewal policy does not reinstate coverage 
for an employee that had already been 
terminated by a known dishonest act; it 
simply continues whatever coverage existed 
at the time of renewal. To hold otherwise 
would be contrary to the principle that an 
insurer does not agree to insure a bank 
from losses caused by an officer known to 
be dishonest prior to the losses. 
672 S.W. 2d at 647 (citation omitted, emphasis added.) 
That holding is directly applicable to the present 
case. In both cases, the juries found that the lending 
institution learned of dishonest acts on the part of an 
employee prior to the purchase of a new bond. Section 11 of 
the bond is identical in both cases. The trial court was wrong 
in reinstating coverage for Larry Glad under the Aetna Bond 
where coverage had terminated as to Larry Glad under the prior 
F&D bond as of mid-December 1981. The trial court's legal 
conclusion is simply not defensible. 
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Similarly, in Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970), an insurance policy 
provided an exclusion from coverage for any employee who was 
known by the insured to have committed any fraudulent or 
dishonest act. The court found that it was undisputed that the 
insured knew of a dishonest act by the subject employee which 
occurred prior to his becoming employed by the insured. 
Therefore, the court held that coverage must be defeated 
ab initio. The court further ruled that such an 
exclusionary clause was reasonable and valid. 
In this case, Aetna's counsel attempted by inference 
to explain the operation of Section 11 to the jury during 
opening statement (October 27, 1989, Tr. Trans., R. at 2921.80) 
and closing argument (November 24, 1989, Tr. Trans., R. at 
2917.211-.215). But the trial court had previously articulated 
its position that Section 11 would not be allowed to defeat 
coverage (see, e.g., Transcript of October 20, 1987 hearing 
on Motion for Directed Verdict, R. at 2912.207-.210; see 
also R. at 2909/10, .34-.35; and 2906.27-.29), and it 
prevented complete explanation of this provision to the jury. 
(R. at 2917.59-.60; defendant's proposed Jury Instructions 8, 9 
and 32, R. at 1233, 1234, and 1213.) 
The result of the trial court's position on this 
issue is evident in the form and content of the jury 
instructions, special verdict and special interrogatories, as 
well as the court's judgment for Home Savings despite the 
jury's answers to Special Interrogatories 5-8. The trial court 
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refused, over Aetna's objection, to give proffered 
instructions 8, 9, and 32 (R. at 2917.59-60; R. at 1233, 1234, 
and 1213, copies included at Document Addendum F to Aetna's 
Appellant's Brief), so the jury had no instruction on whether 
it could consider the Section 11 issue and, if so, how it 
should go about deciding it, or what the effect of its findings 
would be. The trial court also refused to include a Section 11 
issue identifiable to the jury in any portion of the Special 
Verdict. (A copy of the Special Verdict proposed by Aetna (R. 
at 1218-1223) is included at Document Addendum H to Aetna's 
Appellant's Brief.) 
Section 11 was included subliminally in the Special 
Interrogatories as Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8. The trial court only 
included those Special Interrogatories to avoid the necessity 
of retrial if it were reversed on appeal based on the jurors' 
legal interpretation of Section 11. (Transcript of October 20, 
1987 hearing, R. at 2912.207-.210.) Nevertheless, the jury's 
answers on Special Interrogatory Nos. 5-8 reflect its common 
sense intention that Aetna should prevail on the public policy 
embodied in Section 11. By responding as they did, the jury 
concluded that Aetna would prevail because Home Savings knew of 
Larry Glad's dishonesty many months before Aetna wrote the 
Bond. (See also Juror Affidavits, R. at 2032-2053, and 
2055-2057; copies are included at Document Addendum J.) 
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C. Summary. 
The reasoning of the courts in Central Bank and 
Ritchie Grocer is sound and directly applicable to the 
case at bar. A savings and loan institution should not be able 
to obtain fidelity coverage for an employee who is known to 
have been dishonest and who was fired for that dishonesty seven 
months before the Bond was purchased. In this case, the jury 
concluded that preventing Home Savings from taking advantage of 
Aetna in this manner was the appropriate resolution, and it 
made specific findings consistent with that approach. The 
integrity of these jury findings should be upheld, and the 
validity of the Central Bank and Ritchie Grocer reasoning 
should be adopted by this court. 
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POINT II 
HOME SAVINGS IS NOT COVERED UNDER AETNA'S FIDELITY 
BOND FOR ANY LOSS CAUSED BY LARRY GLAD BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF DISCOVERED ITS LOSS PRIOR TO THE 
PERIOD OF THE BOND 
A. The Motion for Summary Judgment on Discovery of Loss, 
On July 31, 1987, Aetna moved for summary judgment 
because Home Savings had discovered the likelihood of its 
impending loss prior to the period of coverage provided in the 
Bond. In addition, prior to its purchase of Aetna's Bond, Home 
Savings had received notice from third parties, through 
letters, lawsuits, and bank examinations, of claims involving 
fraud and dishonesty. After extensive briefs and oral 
argument, the trial court denied Aetna's motion on August 25, 
1987. (R. at p. 344.) The court's ruling (a copy is included 
at Tab I of Document Addendum) states that although "the 
dishonesty of [its] employee, Larry Glad, was known before the 
policy period commenced," Home Savings did not discover a "loss 
sustained" until "the judgment in or settlement of the 
Armitage case" when Aetna's Bond was in effect. This is an 
erroneous legal conclusion which is entitled to de novo 
review on the merits. 
B. Discovery-Type Coverage. 
The proper interpretation of the Bond must start with 
its language. According to the preamble, there is coverage 
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"with respect to loss sustained by the insured at any time 
but discovered during the Bond Period . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) An important Rider to the Bond on form SR 6091 
provides for the insured's discovery to occur in either of two 
separate ways. Objectively: 
Discovery occurs when the insured becomes 
aware of facts which would cause a 
reasonable person to assume that a loss 
covered by the bond has been or will be 
incurred even though the exact amount or 
details of loss may not be then known. 
or, per se: 
Notice to the insured of an actual or 
potential claim by a third party which 
alleges that the insured is liable under 
circumstances, which, if true, would create a 
loss under this bond constitutes such 
discovery. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Bond on Standard Form 22 provides fidelity 
coverage which is common in the financial industry. (Banks are 
frequently covered by Bankers Blanket Bond, Standard Form 
No. 24.) The policy is called a "discovery bond," as 
distinguished from an "occurrences bond," which would cover any 
insured event that occurs within the period of the bond, no 
matter when the insured becomes aware of that event. See, 
e.g., USLIFE Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp., 
115 Cal. App. 2d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1981). 
Under a discovery bond, discovery of loss "means the 
date the fraud was discovered by the Bank - not the date the 
Bank was called upon to make good the loss." Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 729, 
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739 (5th Cir. 1970). Loss refers to the awareness of 
conditions out of which a claim may arise, not to the insured's 
adjudicated liability for that loss. 13A Couch on Insurance 
2d § 49:216 (1982). Under the objective standard, discovery 
occurs when "a reasonable insured would understand the 
significance of [the facts] connoting the commission of a 
fraud." Perkins v. Clinton State Bank, supra, 593 F.2d 
327, 334 (8th Cir. 1979). 
"Despite the years of litigation, the definition set 
forth in American Sur. Co. of New York v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 
133, 18 S.Ct. 552, 42 L.Ed. 977 (1898), continues to reappear 
as the basic yardstick" on the meaning of discovery of loss. 
Alfalfa Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 376 
F.Supp. 901, 906 (W.D. Okla. 1973). 
Paraphrased, 'discovery1 means that time 
when the insured gains sufficient factual 
knowledge, not mere suspicion, which would 
justify a careful and prudent man [sic] 
in charging another with dishonesty. 
Id. at 906. Accord: Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 
Olmstead Etc., 83 Cal. App. 3d 593, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1978); 
USLIFE Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. National Sur. Corp., 115 Cal. 
App. 2d 336, 171 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1981); Perkins v. 
Clinton State Bank, 593 F.2d 327, 334 (8th Cir. 1979); First 
Nat'l. Bank of Fleming v. Maryland Casualty Co., 41 Colo. App. 
195, 581 P.2d 744, 745 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); United States 
Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Empire State Bank, 448 F.2d 360, 
364-65 (8th Cir. 1971); and National Newark & Essex Bank v. 
American Ins. Co., 76 N.J. 64, 385 A.2d 1216, 1224 (1978). 
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Under the Bond's per se standard of discovery, 
notice to the insured by third parties of actual or potential 
claims which, if true, would give rise to a loss covered by the 
bond, "constitutes such discovery." Rider 6091. By either the 
objective or per se definition, Home Savings definitely 
discovered the loss prior to June 21, 1982, the date the Bond 
became effective. 
C. Home Savings' Knowledge of Larry Glad's Dishonesty and 
Discovery of its Loss. 
In its Amended Complaint, Home Savings alleged that 
its employee, Larry Glad, committed certain dishonest or 
fraudulent acts. This conduct all occurred in October, 
November, and December 1981, consistent with the allegations 
contained in paragraph 9 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (R. 
at pp. 16-18.) Assuming the conduct constitutes "dishonesty" 
as defined by the Bond, both the conduct and the actual and 
reasonably anticipated loss from the AFCO investor loans, were 
extensively known by Home Savings long before it purchased the 
Bond. The facts which were submitted to the trial court in 
support of Aetna's Motion for Summary Judgment, and which were 
substantiated at trial, are itemized in paragraph 2 of the 
Statement of Facts, above. 
The three lawsuits filed against Home Savings merit 
additional detail. On March 26, 1982, a complaint was filed by 
David and Patricia Bott against Home Savings in Box Elder 
County, Utah (Civil No. 17132). The Bott Complaint was 
answered by Home Savings on April 28, 1982. (Tr. Exs. 356 and 
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357.) Pages 3, 4 and 5 of the Bott Complaint contain a 
narrative recitation of the very irregularities in the AFCO 
investor second mortgage loans which later formed the basis of 
the judgment in Armitage. 
On April 7, 1982, approximately three hundred (300) 
AFCO investors filed a complaint in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court against Home Savings and other financial 
institutions. (See Alcorn, et al. v. Grant C. Affleck, et 
al. Complaint, Adversary Proceeding No. 82-0333, Tr. 
Ex. 358.) The Alcorn Complaint was served on Home Savings1 
President, Howard Bradshaw, on April 13, 1982. (See 
Tr. Ex. 359.) Pages 20 through 26 of the Alcorn Complaint 
(see particularly para. 23 at p. 25) alleged Home Savings' 
improper association and involvement in the sale and 
distribution of the AFCO securities, as well as its commission 
of common law fraud and its departure from conventional and 
standard lending practices. 
The Alcorn Complaint was dismissed on Home Savings1 
motion (R. at 3072-80) on July 21, 1982, for lack of Bankruptcy 
Court jurisdiction. (R. at 3070.) On July 22, 1982, it was 
refiled (with a few new plaintiff and defendant parties) in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Utah as Abbott, et 
al. v. Carvel Shaffer, et al., Civil No. C82-0628K. Abbott 
v. Shaffer was severed for trial against individual 
lender/defendants. That complaint was the basis of the 
Armitage v. Home Savings trial and judgment. 
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On April 29, 1982, a complaint was filed by Richard 
and Barbara Clifford against Home Savings in the District Court 
for Davis County, Utah. (Tr. Ex. 360.) A copy of that 
complaint, as well as an accompanying Restraining Order and 
Order to Show Cause, were served on Home Savings on April 30, 
1982. (R. at 3087.) Pages 1 through 4 of the Clifford 
Complaint contain numerous specific allegations with regard to 
loan processing and closing irregularities by Home Savings as 
to the Clifford transaction and also as to forty (40) 
additional AFCO investor loan transactions with Home Savings & 
Loan. 
Each of the facts recited in paragraph 2 of the 
Statement of Facts would alone constitute objective discovery 
of loss prior to the issuance of Aetna's Bond. The letters 
from third parties, the lawsuits, and the FHLBB Report of 
Examination each also constitute discovery of loss under the 
Bond's per se standard, which is satisfied by notice of 
"actual or potential claim by a third party which 
alleges . . . circumstances, which, if true, would create a 
loss under the bond." (Rider 6091.) The third-party 
allegations and notices were tried in the Armitage case, and 
the jury there found them to be true. There could be no 
clearer test of per se discovery. 
Neither the Bond nor the law require that for 
discovery of loss to have occurred, the insured must be 
certain about the loss. The Bond's objective standard of 
discovery only requires that a reasonable person would have 
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cause to "assume" that a loss had been or would be incurred 
"even though the exact amount or details of loss may not then 
be known." Rider SR 6091. The case law is in accord. See, 
e.g., USLIFE v. National Sur. Corp., supra, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. at 398. 
No objective or per se factors changed between 
the first half of 1982 and the month of December 1982 when Home 
Savings finally gave notice to both Aetna and F&D that lawsuits 
from the AFCO scheme were then pending against it. The 
December 1982 letters from Home Savings' counsel (Tr. Exs. 119 
and 12 0, copies included at Tab 119 and 12 0 of Exhibit 
Addendum) notifying Aetna of pending claims do not contain one 
shred of information which was not actually known to Home 
Savings prior to June 21, 1982, when the Bond went into 
effect. Home Savings admitted in its report to the FHLBB of 
Violations of Criminal Statutes (Tr. Ex. 226A; copy included at 
Tab 226A of Exhibit Addendum) that it was put on notice on 
April 7, 1982, of all the significant irregularities in the 
AFCO investor loan program. This notice was imparted to Home 
Savings by the allegations in the massive Alcorn v. Affleck 
lawsuit. 
D. Conclusion. 
The trial court considered the evidence at summary 
judgment and ruled as a matter of law that before Home Savings 
purchased the Aetna Bond, it was aware of Larry Glad's conduct 
and the problems with the AFCO investor loans. But then the 
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trial court improperly ruled, also as a matter of law, that it 
was the timing of the "loss sustained" which triggered coverage 
under the Bond. After that misreading of the Bond, the trial 
court either did not perceive or else neglected to address the 
per se standard of discovery altogether. The Bond should 
be enforced as written, consistent with the interpretation of 
courts throughout the country. 
In response to Special Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4, 
the jury in this case found that Home Savings had omitted or 
misrepresented material information in applying for the Aetna 
Bond. (See Point III, below.) A primary explanation for this 
result is that the jury — the final arbiter of the reasonable 
person — had concluded that Home Savings had enough 
information before it purchased the Aetna Bond reasonably to 
assume that a covered loss had or would have occurred with the 
AFCO investor loans. The determination of the jury should be 
sustained. The decision of the trial court should be reversed 
with remand for entry of judgment in favor of Aetna. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING 
THE JURY'S RESPONSES ON SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES NOS. 2 AND 4 AND ENTERING 
A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY'S RESPONSES 
The Utah insurance statute governing the Bond 
application process in this case, U.C.A. § 31-19-8(1) (1974 
ed.), prevents recovery by an insured if the insured made 
misrepresentations or omissions in the application, provided 
such were either fraudulent or material or that the insurer 
would not have issued the coverage if it had known the facts. 
The jury below found two of those three elements - materiality 
and that Aetna would not have issued the coverage. The trial 
court mistakenly set aside those jury findings. In order to do 
so, the court erred by misinterpreting the statute to require 
both materiality and that the insurer would not have issued the 
coverage. The court agreed that there was an evidentiary basis 
for materiality, which taken alone required judgment for Aetna, 
but then erred again by requiring the third element as well as 
finding an insufficient basis for the jury's conclusion that 
Aetna would not have issued the coverage. 
A. The Jury's Determination and the Supporting Evidence. 
The jury answered Special Interrogatories 2 and 4 
pertaining to Home Savings' misrepresentations in the Bond 
application process (see R. at 1352-1353, attached at Document 
Addendum D). The jury found that Home Savings made 
"unintentional" misrepresentations or omissions of facts were 
-45-
known by Home Savings, which materially affected Aetna's 
risks under the Bond, and that Aetna would not have issued 
the Bond or would have excluded the risk disclosed if it had 
known those facts. (See Jury's Answer to Special 
Interrogatory No. 2, R. at 1352.) In addition, the jury found 
that Home Savings failed ("unintentionally'1) to disclose 
material facts known by Home Savings beyond those requested on 
the Application Questionnaire. (See Jury's Answer to Special 
Interrogatory No. 4, R. at 1352-1353.) 
In the trial court's Memorandum Decision of March 4, 
1988 at 9-14 (R. at 2066-2071), the court concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to support those findings, and set 
the jury decision aside. Instead of following the statutory 
mandate requiring only one of the requisite elements and 
reviewing the entire body of evidence to determine whether 
there was an adequate basis for the jury's decision, the trial 
court ruled that the testimony of Don Bradshaw, an independent 
insurance agent, and David Robinson, Aetna's bond underwriter, 
was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the 
information was "material" to Aetna. (R. at 2068-2070.) 
Setting aside the jury decision was improper. The 
jury determined unanimously that it had sufficient information 
to conclude that Home Savings had failed to provide information 
to Aetna, which it should have provided, and which would have 
resulted in Aetna's refusing to write the Bond coverage. (R. 
at 2917.248-.260; 1351-1353.) The jury heard evidence 
throughout the four and one-half week trial that long before 
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Home Savings purchased the Bond, its management was aware of 
Larry Glad's dishonesty, as well as the actual or potential 
losses on the AFCO investor loans. (See paragraph 2 of 
Statement of Facts, above.) Furthermore, Mr. Bradshaw and 
Mr. Robinson specifically testified about the issue of 
materiality. 
David Robinson, Aetna's bond underwriting manager, 
testified that if Aetna had received accurate responses from 
Home Savings on the application regarding loan procedures in 
place at Home Savings, Aetna would have issued an interpretive 
letter limiting coverage (R. at 2916-11, .20-.23, .51-.52); if 
Home Savings had disclosed the firing of Larry Glad or the 
contents of Grant Affleck's letter (Trial Exhibit 20), Aetna 
would have re-examined writing the Bond at all (R. at 2916.23 
-.24); and if Aetna had known of the AFCO bankruptcy, attorney 
letters and lawsuits, it would not have written the Bond (R. 
at 2916.24-.25). Mr. Robinson also explained that Aetna's risk 
was greatly increased by Home Savings' undisclosed problems 
with regulators, insider abuse, deviations from standard 
practices, and potential claims. (R. at 2916.25 -.26.) 
Don Bradshaw, the agent who wrote the Bond, but who also had 
close ties with Home Savings, testified that he would not have 
taken the application if he had known of any possible claims 
Home Savings might make (R. at 2916.67), or of claimed fraud 
and dishonesty with regard to the AFCO investor loans (id. at 
.56-.57, .60), or of Larry Glad's firing (id. at .65), or of 
Home Savings' reserve for uncollected interest on the loans 
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tied to possible dishonesty (id. at .60-.71). However, it 
was also apparent from the mass of other trial evidence that 
the misrepresented and undisclosed facts would be material to 
anyone issuing a bond that might cover that very subject matter 
about which Home Savings had so much information and notice. 
Normally, a judge cannot intervene in the jury's 
factual decisions. A jury determination must be upheld if it 
is "supported by substantial competent evidence." Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,21 (Utah 
1989) . The trial court did not meet the very high standard 
that is required before allowing such intervention. 
B. The Statutory Standard. 
The misrepresentation issue is governed by Utah's 
statute on insurance applications. The statute in effect 
during July of 1982, when Home Savings applied for the Bond, 
was Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-8(1)(1974). It provided as follows: 
31-19-8. REPRESENTATIONS IN APPLICATIONS -
(1) All statements and descriptions in any 
application for an insurance policy or 
annuity contract, or for the reinstatement 
or renewal thereof, by or in behalf of the 
insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be 
representations and not warranties. 
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment 
of facts, and incorrect statements shall 
not prevent a recovery under the policy or 
contract unless: 
(a) fraudulent; or 
(b) material either to the acceptance 
of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by 
the insurer; or 
(c) The insurer in good faith either 
would not have issued the policy or 
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contract, or would not have issued, 
reinstated or renewed it at the same 
premium rate, or would not have issued , 
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract 
in as large an amount, or would not have 
provided coverage with respect to the 
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true 
facts had been made known to the insurer as 
required either by the application for the 
policy or contract or otherwise. 
In Jury Instruction No. 33, the Court instructed the 
jury with regard to this issue as follows: 
Aetna also claims that there were 
unintentional misrepresentations or 
nondisclosure of facts known by Home 
Savings on the application questionnaire 
which facts materially affected its risks 
under the bond and that it would not have 
issued the bond or would have excluded the 
risk disclosed if it had known these 
facts. Aetna must establish each aspect of 
this claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(R. at 1335.) In special Jury Interrogatory No. 2, the jury 
was asked to answer the following question: 
In accordance with the standard of proof 
required in Numbered Paragraph 2 of Jury 
Instruction No. 33, did Aetna prove that 
there were unintentional misrepresentations 
or nondisclosure of facts known by Home 
Savings on the application questionnaire 
which facts materially affected its risks 
under the bond and that it would not 
have issued the bond or would have 
excluded the risk disclosed if it had known 
these facts? 
(Emphasis added). The jury answered this Interrogatory, "Yes," 
finding both materiality and that Aetna would not have 
written this coverage if it had known the same facts as Home 
Savings. 
In the trial court's post-trial Memorandum Decision 
of March 4, 1988, the court improperly ruled that the "statute 
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provides that factual omissions in an application for insurance 
shall not prevent recovery unless the facts are material and 
would have resulted in the insurer not issuing the policy or 
excluding the risk disclosed. . . . " (R. at 2067-2068) 
(emphasis added.) The court went on to find that 
Mr. Bradshaw's testimony provided "an evidentiary basis for the 
materiality of the information known by Home" (R. at 2068), but 
that neither Mr. Bradshaw nor Mr. Robinson's testimony was 
sufficient to establish the third element. The trial court 
overlooked the fact that only one element need be established. 
The Utah Supreme Court has decided a case virtually 
on all fours with the jury verdict herein, Berger v. Minnesota 
Mutual Life Insurance Co.# 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986). In 
Berger, the plaintiff's deceased husband had obtained a 
credit life insurance policy from the defendant. The jury 
found that the decedent had made misrepresentations in the 
application which were "false but not fraudulently made." 
Id. at 389. The jury also found both materiality and that 
the insurer would not have issued the coverage if it had known 
the facts. 
The Berger court held that just one of the 
statutory elements need be established in order to defeat 
coverage: 
The statutory alternatives are stated in 
the disjunctive/ not the conjunctive. In 
order to invalidate a policy because of a 
misrepresentation by the insured, an 
insurer need prove applicable only one of 
the above provisions. 
Id. at 390 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
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In the present case, as in Berger, the 
misrepresentations made by Home Savings were false but not 
fraudulently made. The jury did not find the first statutory 
element, fraud, but it found both of the other two elements. 
The Berger holdings were subsequently followed in 
Hardy v. Prudential Insurance Co., 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988). 
In Hardy, the court again held that the statutory elements 
are stated in the disjunctive, so only one element need be 
proven for the insurer to prevail. Id. at 765-66. 
As noted in Berger, five other states have statutes 
virtually identical to the Utah statute applicable to this 
case. A number of decisions interpreting those statutes have 
been issued in harmony with Berger. Coppin v. Shelter Mut. 
Ins. Co., 742 P.2d 594 (Okla. Ct. App., 1987); Matthews v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 372, 443 P.2d 456, 460 (1968) 
("A contract of insurance, and the liability of an insurer, may 
be avoided by reason of . . . a misstatement of matters 
material to the risk.11); Wardle v. Int'l. Health & Life Ins. 
Co., 97 Idaho 668, 551 P.2d 623 (1976); Kentner v. Gulf Ins. 
Co., 297 Or. 470, 686 P.2d 339, 343 (1984) (modified at 689 
P.2d 955 (Or. 1984)); Hollinger v. Mutual Benefit Life 
Insurance Co., 192 Colo. 377, 560 P.2d 824, 827 (Colo. 1977). 
In the present case, the jury went far beyond the 
statutory minimum elements by finding that the facts known by 
Home Savings were material, and that Aetna would not have 
issued the bond or would have restricted coverage if it had 
known those facts. Therefore, the additional reference in the 
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Special Interrogatory to the "unintentional" nature of the 
misrepresentations is superfluous. 
C. The Common Law Standard. 
Home Savings had a common law obligation to 
disclose all information to Aetna which was material to the 
risk undertaken by Aetna in issuing the fidelity bond to Home. 
Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, 73 Cal. Rptr. 564, 447 P.2d 
956 (Cal. 1968); Phoenix Sav. and Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty 
and Sur. Co., 266 F.Supp. 465 (D.C. Md. 1966); West Am. Fin. 
Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 61 P.2d 963 (Cal. App. 1936). 
Under this common law duty, Home Savings had an obligation to 
divulge any and all material information, even if not 
specifically requested by Aetna, which directly affected 
Aetna's risk in issuing the Bond. A brief review of the three 
foregoing cases demonstrates that Home Savings breached its 
common law duty at the time it purchased the Bond by failing to 
disclose what it knew of Larry Glad's misconduct and of its 
actual and potential losses on the AFCO investor loans. 
In West Am. Fin. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., and 
Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki, the California court 
carefully articulated the common law obligation imposed upon an 
insured when applying for a fidelity bond: 
[I]t may be said to be a fundamental 
principle of the law of fidelity guaranty 
that if dishonesty of an agent, whose 
fidelity was guaranteed under a bond, 
exists before or at the time the surety on 
the bond becomes bound thereby, and the 
principal conceals it from the surety at 
the time of obtaining the fidelity bond, 
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the surety is not liable for the losses 
resulting therefrom . . . the mere 
nondisclosure of the circumstances 
affecting the situation of the parties 
which are material for the surety to be 
acquainted with and are within the 
knowledge of the person obtaining the 
surety bond, is undue concealment even 
though not willful or intentional or with a 
view to any advantage to himself, 
61 P.2d 963, 968 (emphasis added); 447 P.2d 956, 960. In 
Sumitomo Bank, the California court stated that this "rule 
imposes an absolute duty upon the obligee to volunteer 
disclosure of all facts materially affecting the risk to the 
surety on a fidelity bond." Id. (emphasis added.) The court 
concluded that " [irrespective of motive or intent, mere 
non-disclosure of facts known by the obligee which materially 
affect the surety's risk, such as prior dishonesty of the 
principal on the fidelity bond, therefore discharges the 
surety." Id. 
These same common law principles were applied by the 
Maryland Federal District Court in Phoenix Savings and Loan 
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. In addition, the court 
in Phoenix Savings held that a fidelity bond identical to the 
one involved in the present case would be deemed null and void 
due to misrepresentations in the application procedure that 
were entirely innocent and unintentional. Specifically, the 
officer completing the guestionnaire was charged with the 
knowledge of all officers and directors in providing complete 
and accurate information on the application. 266 F. Supp. at 
470. (Compare Bond Rider SR 5538, Trial Exhibit 343, at 
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Tab 343 of the Exhibit Addendum, imputing knowledge of "any 
partner or officer" to the principal insured.) 
Home breached its common law obligation to divulge 
all material information by failing to disclose the AFCO 
investor loans and the tremendous amount of activity pertaining 
to those loans at the time of and preceding the application 
process. Question 17 on the application form (Tr. Ex. 122) 
specifically requested information regarding losses, and since 
Home was already booking and experiencing losses related to 
these loans, it was obligated to disclose those to Aetna. This 
type of information is precisely what the California and 
Maryland courts held was vital and material to the suretyfs 
decision of whether or not to insure. 
D. Summary. 
The jury in this case made its determination of 
material misrepresentation and omission based on ample 
evidence. That determination should not have been overridden 
by the trial court. The Court of Appeals should reverse the 
trial court and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of 
"no cause of action" in favor of Aetna. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED HOME SAVINGS 
TO RECOVER UNDER AETNA'S BOND THOSE LOSSES FROM 
THE AFCO INVESTOR LOANS WHICH RESULTED FROM HOME SAVINGS1 
VIOLATIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment on the Bond's Trading 
Exclusion Rider, 
The Bond includes Rider SR 6030a, which excludes from 
coverage any loss resulting directly or indirectly from trading 
in securities. (See Tr. Ex. 343 p. 22.) On August 31, 
1987, Aetna moved for summary judgment to exclude bond coverage 
for that portion of the Armitage judgment which arose from 
Home Savings1 violations of state and federal security laws. 
Aetna's motion was supported by what the trial court called 
"the undisputed facts" (R. 331), including selected jury 
instructions and Special Verdict Form from the Armitage 
trial, as well as an affidavit from Francis X. LeMunyon, a Vice 
President of the Surety Association of America. (Copies of the 
Armitage jury instructions, Armitage Special Verdict Form, 
and the LeMunyon Affidavit are included as Document 
Addendums K, E, and L, respectively, to Aetna's Appellant's 
Brief.) (These Addendum documents are included in the Record 
at R. 210 through 210.87.) 
By Minute Entry dated August 19, 1987 (a copy is 
included as Document Addendum M to Aetna's Appellant's Brief), 
the trial court denied Aetna's motion, in spite of its correct 
conclusion that "while no reference [in Rider SR 603 0a"; is made 
to trading in securities, . . no reasonable person could 
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believe that the Rider has reference to anything but 
securities.11 The trial court's ruling turned on a semantical 
declaration which was not supported by reasoned analysis or 
legal authority. It simply reads: 
The nature of the evidence, jury 
instructions and verdict in Armitage 
necessarily requires the nomenclature 
'involved in the sale or exchange of 
securities' to characterize Home's conduct 
and the jury's findings. Such 
'involvement,' however does not necessarily 
equate to 'trading' in securities as that 
term is used in rider SR 6030a. 
The trial court's decision overlooks the important language in 
Rider SR 603 0a which excludes "loss resulting directly or 
indirectly in trading." 
B. The Text and History of the Trading Exclusion. 
Rider SR 6030a reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The underwriter shall not be liable 
under the attached bond for any loss 
resulting directly or indirectly from 
trading, with or without the knowledge of 
the Insured, in the name of the Insured or 
otherwise, . . . 
By its express terms, Rider SR 6030a is specifically "FOR USE 
WITH BLANKET BONDS, STANDARD FORMS NOS. 5, 22, 24, AND 28. 
'DISCOVERY' FORMS TO DELETE TRADING LOSS COVERAGE." 
Paragraph 2 of Rider 6030a says "[t]his rider applies to loss 
sustained at any time but discovered after 12:01 a.m. on 
June 21, 1982" when the Bond went into effect. 
The Savings and Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form 
No. 22, and its related riders were drafted by the Surety 
Association of America ("SAA"). The SAA is a non-profit 
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association of insurance companies which provide surety and 
indemnity coverage throughout the country. In preparing 
standard insurance policies, the SAA works with trade 
associations for those industries which are affected by the 
coverage contained in any given form, such as the American 
Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings and Loan 
Associations. (LeMunyon Affidavit at paragraphs 1 through 4, 
R. at 210.10-.12.) The trading exclusion rider was designed to 
cover activities involving the sale, purchase and trade of 
securities, and it pertains to losses resulting from either 
legal or illegal trading in securities. (LeMunyon Affidavit at 
paragraph 11.) 
The trading exclusion rider functions as an 
affirmative limitation on policy coverage. An insured can 
override the trading exclusion by purchasing an exemption under 
another Bond Rider SR-6085 and paying appropriately higher 
premiums. (See July 27, 1987 letter from Francis X. LeMunyon, 
together with attached filing letter to Utah Insurance 
Department, all at Document Addendum N to Aetna's Appellant's 
Brief. R. 210.45-.47.) Home did not purchase extended 
coverage for losses resulting from trading in securities. 
(LeMunyon Affidavit at paragraphs 12 and 13.) 
C. The Law of Trading Exclusions. 
The trading exclusion under Rider 6030a was 
considered and interpreted in the case of Shearson/American 
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Express v. First Continental Bank and Trust Co., 579 F. Supp. 
1305 (W.D. Mo. 1984) in the context of a Banker's Blanket Bond 
Form No. 24. As that case explains, the trading exclusion was 
adopted in the 1970fs from the terms of insurance coverage then 
commonly issued only to stockbrokers. Shearson/American 
Express at 1310, citing Digest of Bank Insurance, 35 (3d ed. 
1977.) (See also LeMunyon Affidavit, paragraph 9.) The 
trading exclusion was added to Blanket Bond Standard Forms 22 
and 24 because of the increased involvement of financial 
institutions in the sale or exchange of securities. (LeMunyon 
Affidavit at paragraphs 10 and 11); Shearson/American Express 
at 310, citing Digest of Bank Insurance, 35 (3d ed. 1977). 
The gradual deregulation of the financial industry 
which occurred in the 1970's resulted in increased activity by 
banks and by savings and loans in the sale, purchase and 
exchange of securities. The high risk of loss associated with 
this new activity was not originally taken into consideration 
by underwriters in calculating appropriate premiums. 
Therefore, both the American Surety Association, and the 
American Bankers Association and the U.S. League of Savings & 
Loan Associations, felt that those financial institutions which 
traded in securities, either directly or indirectly, should pay 
additional premiums for the attendant increased risk. Id. 
In like manner, the premiums of financial institutions which do 
not engage, either directly or indirectly in the purchase or 
sale of securities, reflect a lower level of risk assumption by 
the fidelity insurers. (LeMunyon Affidavit, paragraphs 10 
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through 13); Shearson/American Express at 1311, citing 
Digest of Bank Insurance, 1.3.33 (4th ed. 1981). 
D. The Armitage Judgment — The Cause of Home Savings1 Loss. 
Home Savings' loss resulted from the Armitage jury 
verdict which found Home Savings primarily and secondarily 
liable for fraud involved in the sale or exchange of 
securities. The Armitage jury could not have found Home 
liable on the counts of primary and secondary securities 
violations without finding for each count of the verdict that 
it traded either directly or indirectly in securities. The 
Armitage jury instructions (see Document Addendum K) are 
conclusive on this point. They are summarized as follows: 
1. as a matter of law, the AFCO 
promissory notes given to the AFCO 
investors were securities. (Armitage 
instructions 5.03 and 6.03.) 
2. with respect to liability under 
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193 3, an 
essential element was the finding that Home 
Savings was a "seller" of the AFCO 
securities. (Armitage instruction 6.03.) 
3. in order to find Home Savings liable 
for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder, the jury must find 
that Home Savings engaged in fraudulent 
conduct "in connection with the purchase or 
sale" of a security. (Armitage 
instructions 7.0 through 7.4.) 
4. in order to find Home Savings liable 
under § 61-1-22(1)(a) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, Home Savings must have 
offered or sold securities in violation of 
§§ 3, 10 or 17 of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. (Armitage 
instructions 8.01 through 8.08.) 
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5. in order to find Home Savings liable 
for secondary violations of the securities 
laws, Home Savings had to have either 
controlled or aided or abetted AFCO, its 
agents or Grant Affleck, in the primary 
violations by those parties of the state 
and federal securities laws. (Armitage 
instructions 12.01, .02, and .03.) 
The Armitage judgment was based on Special Verdict 
Forms entered by the jury pursuant to the foregoing 
instructions. Through its Special Verdicts, the jury found 
Home liable on each of 36 separate AFCO investor loans for 
three primary violations of the state and federal securities 
fraud provisions. In addition, the jury found Home secondarily 
liable on the 3 6 AFCO investor loans both for controlling and 
for aiding and abetting Grant Affleck and AFCO in their 
violations of securities laws. The Armitage court entered 
judgment accordingly. (Tr. Ex. 330; a copy is included at 
Tab 330 of Exhibit Addendum.) 
Although the Armitage special verdicts also found 
Home liable for committing common law fraud and for violating 
truth-in-lending provisions of federal and state law, Home's 
commission of these improprieties necessarily occurred in the 
context of its illegal trading in the AFCO securities. 
Furthermore, the fact that Home was found liable for common law 
fraud does not justify ignoring the operation of the trading 
exclusion in light of Home Savings1 securities law violations. 
In Judge Learned Hetnd's now-famous dicta in Irving Nat'l. Bank 
v. Law, 10 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1926), lfif the decision of a 
court on a point of law is based upon several grounds, each is 
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equally authoritative on all, and no one is obiter." Id. at 
724. 
E. Conclusion. 
The judgment should be reversed and remanded for a 
determination of that portion of Home Savings1 losses in the 
Armitage judgment which derived from trading directly or 
indirectly in securities. The damages in this case should be 
reduced proportionately. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
THE BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT 
OF HOME SAVINGS' OFFICERS AND BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS AS THE CAUSE OF ITS LOSS. 
A• Evidence Establishing Home Savings' Bad Business Judgment 
and Mismanagement. 
The jury heard and saw a tremendous amount of 
evidence at trial suggesting that Home Savings incurred 
losses from the AFCO investor loans because of management's 
conscious decision to enter into the AFCO investor loans and 
its failure to follow federal and state lending guidelines, 
industry-recognized safe and sound lending practices, and its 
own internal procedures. 
For example: Fred Smolka, then Director, Executive 
Vice President and Chief Operating Office of Home Savings, 
testified that Larry Glad was not present at the first three 
meetings between Grant Affleck and Home Savings' officers and 
directors regarding the AFCO loan (R. at 2919.137, .154-.155, 
.159); Larry Glad (through deposition testimony read to the 
jury) testified that Affleck and his staff "had literally taken 
over our office" to process the AFCO investor loans (R. at 
2910.137); Home Savings' management was concerned about 
entering into these loans, but did so anyway because they 
thought the loans could be sold on the secondary market (Tr. 
Ex. 39; Fred Smolka test., R. at 2919.185; David Richards 
test., R. at 2907.179-.185; see also Larry Glad testimony, 
R. at 2910.131, .137). The loans were processed too quickly, 
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in one to three days, instead of the usual two weeks to one 
month (L. Glad test., R. at 2910.147); the loans were not 
closed by a Home Savings officer at Home Savings' office 
(F. Smolka test., R. at 2919.107-.Ill, 2920.13, .41-.42); and 
the Board of Directors disregarded red flags that had been 
raised about AFCO, Grant Affleck and the nature of the loans 
(D. Richards test., R. at 2907.179-.183; F. Smolka test., R. at 
2921.138, .140-.141, .161, 2919.8, .19, .35-.36, .146-.148, 
.151-.153, .156-.157, .163-.165, .179-.182, 2920.5-.6, .13, 
.41-.42). 
All of Home Savings1 active involvement and its 
blatant mismanagement is corroborated and described in detail 
in the trial testimony of William Cox, Vice President in Charge 
of Mortgage Lending, and Elaine Reese, as assistant secretary 
of Home Savings and also the loan closing officer. The essence 
of their testimony is hard to improve upon by summary, so 
copies of selected portions are included at Document Addendum 0 
(Cox) and P (Reese). Copies of agreements which Home Savings1 
management entered into with Grant Affleck through negotiations 
by its key officers (Tr. Exs. 8, 9, 10, and 11) are included at 
Exhibit Addendum Tabs 8, 9, 10, and 11. Copies of direct 
(mis)representations by Home Savings' management to the AFCO 
investors (Tr. Exs. 89 and 90) are included at Exhibit Addendum 
Tabs 89 and 90. In the entire trial, there was no evidence 
that Larry Glad ever had any communication with any of the AFCO 
investors, and none of the operative agreements between Home 
Savings and AFCO were negotiated or entered into by Larry Glad. 
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Aetna introduced testimony at trial from some of the 
most knowledgeable experts in the country to establish that 
Home Savings1 own bad business decisions and mismanagement were 
the primary cause of Home Savings1 loss. These witnesses also 
reviewed and interpreted the FHLBB's multiple negative reports 
on Home Savings1 activities and on FHLBB action taken against 
Home Savings for those violations. Aetna's experts were: (1) 
James Croft, the former Director of the FHLBB's Office of 
Examinations and Supervision, author of books and articles in 
the subject area, officer of a large Maryland Savings and Loan, 
university professor and Savings and Loan consultant (R. at 
2923.111-.114); (2) Elaine Weis, former Commissioner of the 
Utah Department of Financial Institutions, Savings and Loan 
consultant, and professor in the University of Utah Department 
of Finances (R. at 2909.64-.74); and (3) Douglas McEachern,, 
C.P.A., partner and National Director of Savings and Loan 
Practice in the national accounting firm of Touche Ross and 
Co., Chairman of the Committee for Savings and Loan Accounting 
and Reporting in the American Institute of CPAs, and 
representative for the accounting industry in several Savings 
and Loan organizations. (R. at 2922.4-.7.) All of these 
experts testified that Home Savings was badly managed, that 
management failed to follow both its own procedures and 
industry standards, that the AFCO investor loans were bad loans 
for Home Savings to make, and that management's decisions led 
to Home Savings' loss. 
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In the FHLBB's Report of Examination for Home Savings 
dated June 4, 1982 (Tr. Ex. 196), the FHLBB found that 
management had subjected Home Savings to possible losses and 
lawsuits on the AFCO investor loans (see Elaine Weis test., 
R. at 2909.107-.109), that management had demonstrated an 
"absence of sound procedures" and a "lack of supervision of 
loan department personnel" (id. at 2909.123), that Home 
Savings had demonstrated poor appraisal practices (id. at 
2909.117), and that Home Savings had entered into the AFCO 
investor loans in a manner inconsistent with its own 
procedures, resulting in possible losses and lawsuits (id. at 
2909.107-.109). Home Savings1 management showed the same 
course of mismanagement for a period of years both before and 
after the AFCO loans. (Tr. Exs. 191, 200, 206, 210, 211; 
Elaine Weis testimony, R. at 2909.126-.131.) 
In addition, Aetna's expert witnesses found a variety 
of serious problems with the AFCO loans, unrelated to Larry 
Glad's alleged dishonesty. Many of those problems were 
apparent on the face of the loan documents and should have 
raised red flags for management, loan officers or others 
reviewing the files. Loan documentation on the loans was 
received in many cases after the loan was made (E. Weis test., 
R. at 2909.91), AFCO was listed as the party ordering many 
appraisals instead of Home Savings (id. at 2909.96), some 
AFCO investors had apparently been turned down elsewhere on the 
same loans (i^. at 2909.94-.95), and many AFCO investors 
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showed payment-to-income and total obligations-to-income ratios 
that were far too high (id. at 2909.92-.93). 
As revealed in the FHLBB's 1981 and 1982 Exam 
Reports, Home Savings demonstrated a pattern on conduct of 
continued problems with meeting regulatory standards for loan 
documentation, failures to meet the FHLBB underwriting 
expectations, a high level of scheduled items (problem assets), 
poor appraisal practices, and a lack of attention to detail. 
(Testimony of James Croft, R. at 2923.120.) Given that the 
AFCO investor loans were more complicated and more difficult 
than most loans, and given Home Savings' level of lending 
experience, Home Savings should not have attempted this type of 
transaction; management's attempt to enter into these types of 
loans generated a high number of problem assets or scheduled 
items. (Id. at .121-.123.) Ultimately, because of the types 
of violations occurring in 1981 and 1982, the FHLBB took the 
extraordinary action of entering into a Consent Cease and 
Desist Order with Home Savings in 1986. (Id. at .130-.134; 
see Tr. Ex. 220.) 
More specifically pertaining to the AFCO investor 
loans, it was bad practice for management to allow a loan 
solicitor (such as Larry Glad) to become involved in loan 
processing, underwriting, approval and closing. (Id. 
at .135-.138.) Mr. Croft also testified that because it was 
apparent that the $100,000.00 loan to AFCO and the AFCO 
investor loans were interrelated, the primary source of 
repayment for the investor loans would be AFCO, and Home 
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Savings1 management should have carefully looked at AFCO's 
ability to repay, including evaluating current audited 
financial statements and AFCO's history as a business. (Id. 
at .139-.142.) It was also unreasonable for Home Savings' 
management to allow AFCO to process the investor loans (id. 
at .145-.146); a one to three-day processing time was far too 
fast to insure accurate information (id. at .146); it was 
improper for Home Savings to allow AFCO to close loans outside 
of Home Savings' office (_id. at .146-.147); and senior 
management of Home Savings should have become much more 
involved in administering these loans rather than allowing a 
loan solicitor with a vested interested in closing the loans to 
follow through on those loans (id. at .147). 
The testimony of Mr. McEachern is best summarized in 
defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 378 (summary at Document 
Addendum G), which was prepared by Mr. McEachern and the 
accounting firm of Touche Ross. In the two pages constituting 
Section 1 of that exhibit (id.)/ Mr. McEachern summarized the 
36 AFCO investor loans and whether or not the loan 
documentation in the Home Savings' file justified the making of 
those loans on the face of that documentation. He concluded 
that one of those loans was appropriate, six possibly were 
appropriate, but 29 should not have been made for one or more 
of the following reasons: the debt-service ratio was too high 
for the subject borrower, the borrower had no liquid net worth, 
and/or the payment on the new obligation resulted in too 
dramatic an increase in payments owed by that borrower 
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("payment shock"). (See, e.g., testimony of Douglas 
McEachern, R. at 2922.29-.31.) If management and the Home 
Savings1 officer responsible for the loan approval process had 
properly evaluated nothing more than the loan documentation in 
their own files, they would not have made the vast majority of 
these loans and Home Savings' ultimate loss would have been 
avoided. 
Home Savings' theory at trial was that Larry Glad's 
dishonesty was so egregious that it "pervaded" the entire 
series of AFCO investor loan transactions and made them 
unenforceable. If so, it argued it should not have to show 
that each individual loan was unenforceable because of some 
specific conduct of Larry Glad. 
To the contrary, a case involving multiple 
transactions requires apportionment of loss among various 
causes. This approach is mandated by Fidelity Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 
1981). That case involved a series of poorly performing loans 
which, in conjunction with other factors, caused a bank to go 
out of business. The Ninth Circuit adopted the district 
court's "logical and equitable apportionment between dishonesty 
and other factors" which caused the bank to fail. (Citing 
Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp., 
440 F.Supp. 862, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd. 647 F.2d 933.) 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by 
allowing Home Savings to use the pervasive effect approach and 
by precluding the jury from deciding whether loan losses could 
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be allocated among the other possible causes, including Home's 
mismanagement and bad business judgment. This error occurred, 
over defense counsel's objections, by: (1) refusing to read 
the jury a number of key instructions setting forth Aetna's 
theory on causation (defendant's Requested Instructions 2 and 
42, R. at 1227, 1996); (2) giving jury instructions that 
inaccurately presented Aetna's defense (Jury Instruction 26-3 0, 
R. at 1327-1331) ; (3) refusing to submit to the jury a Special 
Verdict question addressing this issue, as requested by 
defendant (defendant's requested Special Verdict, Question 
No. 6, R. at 1219); and (4) submitting a special verdict to the 
jury which wholly failed to mention Home Savings officers' and 
directors' actions as being a possible cause of Home Savings' 
loss. (Special Verdict, R. at 1347-1350.) 
A party to an action is entitled to have its theory 
of the case fully and fairly presented to the jury through 
appropriate jury instructions. Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 
37 (Utah 1980). An error in jury instructions requires 
reversal if it is determined to have been prejudicial, based on 
a review of the records as a whole. Cambelt Int'l. Corp. v. 
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987); Purflinger v. Artiles, 
727 F.2d 888, 895 (10th Cir. 1984). Error in jury instructions 
is determined "not [by] whether the charge was faultless in 
every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any way 
and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duties 
to determine those issues." Patty Precision Products Co. v. 
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Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 
1988) . 
B. Preclusion of Jury's Consideration of Aetna's Primary 
Factual Defense. 
The trial court's preclusion of the bad business 
judgment/mismanagement defense is found in review of the 
jury instructions and special verdict form imposed by Judge 
Murphy. Over Aetna's objection, the trial court gave Jury 
Instruction No. 29, which precluded the jury from considering 
whether "better policies and procedures or adherence thereto 
would have checked the dishonesty, if any, of Larry Glad and 
prevented a loss that would have otherwise have occurred." The 
trial court refused to give Aetna's proffered Instruction 
No. 42, which proposed that there may be more than one 
"efficient cause of an event or loss" and that the jury could 
consider as a "contributing cause . . . the failure of the 
officers and directors of Home Savings to require compliance 
with appropriate lending practices and procedures . . . ." The 
trial court also refused to give Aetna's proffered Instruction 
No. 2, which proposed that if the losses occurred because of 
plaintiff's "own mismanagement, misfeasance or other negligence 
and/or failure to follow safe and sound lending practices, then 
you must find there was no coverage for Home under the bond." 
In addition to omitting to mention the alternative 
cause of loss claimed by Aetna, the trial court in Instruction 
No. 26 stated that Aetna claims the plaintiff's loss "resulted 
not from the dishonesty of Larry Glad, but that it directly 
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resulted from a separate and independent cause"; however, "for 
Aetna to prevail on this defense [it] must prove the existence 
of an alternative cause [which is] separate and independent 
from Larry Glad's dishonesty, if any." (R. at 1327.) Instead 
of following up that instruction with clarification as to how 
the jury could consider other causes, the trial court gave 
Instruction Nos. 27, 28, 29, and 30. (R. at 1328-1331.) Those 
instructions stated that plaintiff's failure to supervise Larry 
Glad was not a defense, nor the negligent failure to discover 
Glad's dishonesty, nor Home's inadequate policies and 
procedures, nor the negligent failure to follow policies and 
procedures that it did have, nor the negligent hiring of Larry 
Glad. Therefore, taking the instructions on this point as a 
whole, the jury was forced to conclude that Home Savings' 
mismanagement and bad business practices could not be 
considered as a separate cause of the loss. (See also Juror 
Affidavits, R. at 2032-2053, 2055-2057, attached at Document 
Addendum J.) 
This issue on appeal pertains to causation. The 
trial court instructed the jury to the effect that if Larry 
Glad's dishonesty was involved to any extent in causing the 
loss, full bond coverage would be allowed. On the other 
hand, under the instructions as given, if bad business judgment 
or mismanagement were not the exclusive, sole cause of a 
bad loan (thereby precluding even the nominal tainting effect 
of Larry Glad), it could not be considered to any extent in 
apportioning damages. 
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When it came time to draft the Special Verdict form, 
Aetna proposed the following question: "6. Did any loss 
sustained by Home Savings directly result from its 
mismanagement, misconduct, negligence, and/or failure to follow 
safe and sound lending practices?" (R. at 1219.) This, or a 
similar question, would have allowed the jury to indicate such 
causation and then to apportion cause between Larry Glad's 
dishonesty and Home's own mismanagement and bad business 
judgment. The trial court disallowed that language. Instead, 
the jury had to answer the following special verdict question: 
"2. Did the verdict against Home Savings in the lawsuit of 
Armitage, et al. v. Home Savings & Loan, in whole or in 
part, directly result from dishonest or fraudulent acts, if 
any, of Larry Glad?" (R. at 1347) (emphasis added.) Thus, the 
jury was left with an instruction which excluded the 
consideration of bad business judgment and mismanagement for 
any purpose, but which allowed recovery under the Bond if 
Glad's dishonesty was in any way involved ("in whole or in 
part") in the loss sustained by Home Savings. 
C. Conclusion. 
In spite of this combination of misleading 
instructions and the restrictive verdict form, one of the 
jurors (No. 10) still voted outright that Larry Glad's 
dishonesty had not "in whole or in part" caused home Savings' 
loss. (R. at 2917.258 ) A number of other jurors were 
confused by the combination of instructions and verdict form 
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and said so in the affidavits submitted to the Court in 
February 1988. (R. at 2032-2053, 2055-2057, attached at 
Document Addendum J.) The primary complaint of the jury was 
that the instructions and the verdict form took the case out of 
their hands and left them with only one result to reach on the 
thin thread of a finding that Larry Glad was "in part" involved 
in the AFCO investor lending activity. 
The trial court's series of instructions and verdict 
forms nullified Aetna's strongest factual defense. A number of 
jurors claimed they were unfairly prevented from considering 
the alternative cause—that the court had "taken the case away 
from them." (Id.) The prejudice from instructional error is 
clear. This Court should rule in Aetna's favor on this issue 
and remand for a new trial on the basis of prejudicial errors 
in instructing the jury as to causation. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR BY FAILING 
TO REQUIRE HOME SAVINGS TO JOIN ITS PRIOR FIDELITY 
BOND INSURER, F&D OF MARYLAND, AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
A. Aetna's Motion to Join an Indispensable Party, 
On April 15, 1987, Aetna moved for dismissal of Home 
Savings' Complaint for failure to join F&D as an 
indispensable party. (R. at 100-101A) The motion was brought 
to enforce Section 9 of the Bond which is entitled "Limit of 
Liability Under This Bond and Prior Insurance." Section 9 
provides that coverage under Aetna's Bond shall be only excess 
to claims payable on prior insurance, to the extent that the 
loss was "discovered within the period permitted under such 
other bond or policy for the discovery of loss thereunder . . 
. ." (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court ruled against Aetna on its motion. 
(See May 29, 1987, Minute Entry [R. at 143-45]; and June 12, 
1987 Order [R. at 163-65].) This is in spite of the carefully 
drafted language of the F&D and the Aetna bonds, both Standard 
Form 22's, which is calculated to provide a steady line of 
coverage from bond to bond without either overlap or gaps. 
(Don Bradshaw test., R. at 2906.25; also Tr. Ex. 118.) On this 
issue, as on previous ones, the trial court strained the limits 
of both the Bond's language and the law to create coverage for 
Home Savings which it had lost due to its own inexplicable 
failure to pursue recovery on the F&D bond — the bond which 
was in place at the time of Larry Glad's conduct, at the time 
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Home Savings had full knowledge of the nature of that conduct, 
and at the time which Home Savings was booking losses on and 
being sued over the AFCO investor loans which were then in 
total default. 
B. The Law of Mandatory Joinder. 
Rule 19, U.R.Civ.P., provides that a person shall 
be joined as a party if he is subject to process, if his 
presence will not deprive the Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and if "in his absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties." This language affirms 
the traditional purpose of joinder, which is to assure a full 
and just adjudication between the existing parties. Stone v. 
Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631, 637 (1960), 
cert, denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961). See also, Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). 
In Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, etc., 
83 Cal. App. 3d 543, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1978), the court 
considered the dismissal of one insurance company when the 
issue of coverage between prior and subsequent policies was 
raised. Both bonds in that case were fidelity bonds with 
discovery clauses which limited coverage to losses sustained by 
the insured at any time but discovered within the period of the 
bond. Both bonds also had provisions which dealt with prior 
and subsequent coverage by other insurance policies. 
The court in Continental Ins. v. Morgan held that 
where the coverage question was ambiguous because of the 
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"discovery" issue, it was inappropriate to dismiss either 
insurance company. Although the insured in Continental Ins. 
v. Morgan was eventually absolved of the alleged loss, the 
fidelity bonds in that case did require indemnification for 
costs associated with defending the action on the merits. 
(Coverage of Home Savings1 defense costs is also an issue in 
the present case. See discussion in Point VIII, below.) Under 
the circumstances, the court held "[w]here two insurers cover 
the same risk, defense costs must also be shared between them 
pro rata in proportion to the respective coverage afforded by 
them to the insured." 148 Cal. Rptr. at 66. Hence, where 
there is an issue as to which of two insurance policies 
provides coverage, both insuring companies are necessary 
parties to a full and proper adjudication. 
C. The Facts of Two Separate Bonds. 
Prior to June 21, 1982, plaintiff had $900,000 of 
fidelity coverage from "F&D" on Standard Form No. 22, Bond 
No. 60 33 236. (See Exhibit Addendum, Tab 116.) Both the 
Aetna and the F&D bonds are modified by Riders SR 6041 which 
contain identical language defining the extent of coverage for 
loss through "dishonest or fraudulent acts of an Employee." 
Both bonds contain language in Section 9 that 
coverage shall only be excess to claims payable on prior 
insurance. In addition, F&D's bond is modified by Rider 
No. 618, which limits F&D's exposure after termination of the 
bond to only those insurable events "discovered before the time 
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such termination . . . becomes effective." Home Savings let 
the F&D policy expire on June 21, 1982. It did not obtain the 
Aetna Bond until July 14, 1982, although coverage was made 
retroactive to June 21st in order to preserve continuity of 
coverage without overlap or gaps. (Don Bradshaw Test., R. at 
2906.25; Tr. Ex. 118.) 
On December 9, 1982, and December 21, 1982, plaintiff 
notified both F&D and Aetna of claims under their respective 
bonds through identical letters sent by David B. Boyce of the 
law firm Backman, Clark & Marsh and by Thomas A. Quinn of the 
law firm Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. (Tr. Exs. 119 and 120; copies 
included in Exhibit Addendum.) Both F&D and Aetna responded 
that the alleged conduct did not fall under the terms of 
coverage for employee dishonesty or fraud. (Tr. Ex. 140.) 
Both insurers also asserted that because of Section 9 of the 
bonds that Home Savings1 claim, if valid, would be covered by 
the other company. Id. It was these contrary positions 
which required joinder of F&D as a party, as well as the fact 
that by the express terms of the bonds only one or the other 
but not both of the insurers could be liable for the losses. 
D. Conclusion. 
Because of the trial court's erroneous ruling on 
joinder, the case proceeded to trial without F&D, and with 
the trial court having determined as a matter of law that the 
Aetna Bond provided primary coverage because Home Savings 
discovered its "loss sustained" during the period of the Aetna 
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Bond. (See Point II, above). Aetna was thus denied even the 
possibility of apportionment of damages and defense costs. 
This is the incomplete resolution of issues with regard to 
existing parties which Rule 19(a)(1) is designed to avoid, and 
which requires joinder of the other insurer. See, South 
Kamas Irrigation Company v. Provo River Water Users' 
Association, 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P.2d 851, 852 (1960). The 
Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment entered against 
Aetna because the trial court's failure to require the joinder 
of P&D severely prejudiced Aetna's defense at trial. See 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989). 
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POINT VII 
PROPER CALCULATION OF HOME'S 
LOSSES REQUIRES AN OFFSET FOR FUNDS 
COLLECTED DIRECTLY THROUGH RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENTS 
AND OTHER FUNDS PAID FOR HOME SAVINGS' BENEFIT. 
At trial, Home Savings proved the net amount of each 
of the 36 AFCO investor loans and it claimed and was awarded 
the aggregate as its principal damages. However, Home Savings 
also created Trial Exhibit 83 (copy included at Tab 83 of 
Exhibit Addendum), which shows that Home Savings recouped 
$2 37,760.77 from those AFCO investor loans. 
These funds were recovered by Home Savings through 
several unique arrangements. For instance, on four of the 
loans, Home Savings put restrictive endorsements ("Pay to the 
Order of Home Savings") on the back of the proceeds check prior 
to closing to insure that the funds would never leave its 
control. (E. Reese test., R. at 2903.114, and 2903.136-.138.) 
(See Tr. Exs. 163, 177, 172X, and 147W.) This was done with 
the knowledge and approval of Vice President, Bill Cox. (R. at 
2903.114 and 2903.136-.138.) On other loans, the checks were 
endorsed by the borrower to AFCO, and then by Grant Affleck on 
behalf of AFCO back to Home Savings. (Tr. Exs. 174X and 168U; 
E. Reese test., R. at 2903.140.) 
Late in December 1981, after Larry Glad had been 
fired and when AFCO's payments to Home Savings were all 
bouncing (E. Reese test., R. at 2803.143-.144), Bill Cox gave 
specific instructions to Home Savings' loan closing officer, 
Elaine Reese, to close certain loans and use the proceeds to 
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cover specific problems. (Tr. Ex. 67; a copy is included at 
Tab 67 of Exhibit Addendum.) Cox was directed to give that 
instruction by Executive Vice President Fred Smolka. (W. Cox 
test., R. at 2905.129-.13 0.) These circumstances, and Cox's 
note to Elaine Reese (Tr. Ex. 67) , are some of the most blatant 
evidence of Home Savings' direct relationship with Grant 
Affleck and its accoironodation of the unusual AFCO investor loan 
arrangements. This was all done because Home Savings had lost 
control of its loan process to Grant Affleck. (E. Reese test., 
R. at 2903.141-.142.) Larry Glad had no involvement, control, 
or input whatsoever in these arrangements. 
As shown by Trial Exhibit 83 and the trial testimony 
of Bill Cox (R. at 2905.97-.99), Home Savings recovered 
$237,760.77 from proceeds of the AFCO investor loans and 
disposed of those funds to its own benefit and at its sole 
discretion. Importantly, Larry Glad had nothing whatsoever to 
do with conceiving or executing this recoupment project. This 
insidious aspect of the AFCO investor loans is further evidence 
(see Point V, above) of Home Savings' management's direct 
involvement in and manipulation of the entire investment 
scheme. 
The funds were first used to pay off principal and 
interest on the $100,000 loan that Home Savings had made to 
AFCO on November 10, 1981. According to all the trial 
evidence, that was a bad loan because of President Howard 
Bradshaw's and Executive Vice President Fred Smolka's 
carelessness in negotiating and approving the loan on behalf of 
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Home Savings. (See discussion on Bad Business Judgment and 
Mismanagement at Point V, above.) 
Home Savings next used the funds to rescind the 
Snitkoff and Sadler loans, which were not directly involved in 
the trial of this case. Snitkoff and Sadler were AFCO 
investors. The proceeds of their loans had been given to Grant 
Affleck through the special arrangements between Affleck and 
Home Savings1 management, but the borrowers rescinded before 
Home Savings had recorded the trust deeds. (W. Cox test., R. 
at 2905.97-.98; E. Reese test.; R. at 2903.146-.147.) Thus, a 
$65,823.33 loss was averted by Home Savings1 recoupment of loan 
funds from other, less fortunate AFCO investors who later 
became parties in the Armitage lawsuit. 
Exhibit 83 also shows that Home Savings made three 
payments directly to AFCO from the investor funds that it had 
recouped. This $38,235.86 represents a gratuitous transfer 
from Home Savings of funds which it had in its possession. 
Finally, although in its calculation of damages the 
trial court deducted the 3 percent origination fee paid to Home 
Savings by the AFCO investors on the loans which were rescinded 
in the Armitage judgment, it failed to deduct the 2.5 percent 
commitment fee paid to Home Savings by AFCO for those loans. 
(Cf., Tr. Ex. 83 with Tr. Exs. 11 and 8.) So proper 
calculation of Home Savings1 true loss would require reduction 
of the $31,875.00 commitment fee as well. 
The funds which Home Savings recouped from the 
disbursement of the AFCO investor loans represents losses which 
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Home Savings did not sustain. If Home Savings had 
properly used those funds to reduce the principal on the 3 6 
AFCO investor loans which were not being paid by Grant Affleck 
as agreed (see, e.g., Tr. Ex. 81) and which were all in 
default, there would have been a direct reduction in the losses 
Home Savings experienced in the Armitage judgment. 
Accordingly, the trial court should have reduced the losses on 
the principal of the AFCO investor loans by $237,760.77 in 
calculating its judgment. 
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POINT VIII 
HOME SAVINGS IS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION 
FOR THE LEGAL FEES AWARDED TO THE ARMITAGE PLAINTIFFS 
NOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF COURT COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING 
THE ARMITAGE LITIGATION 
A. The Legal Fees Awarded to the Armitage Plaintiffs, 
In order for the attorney's fees of a third-party 
(i.e., the Armitage plaintiffs) to be recoverable by an 
insured in an action to enforce a fidelity bond, the 
third-party's causes of action must fall within the terms of 
the insured's policy coverage. Continental Bank & Trust Co. 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.# 550 P.2d 222, 223 (Utah 
1976); 15A Couch on Insurance 2d § 57:47 at 136-38 (1983). 
The Federal District Court in the Armitage case expressly 
awarded the Armitage plaintiffs their attorney's fees on the 
basis of "the federal and state truth in lending statutes and 
the Utah securities statute . . . ." (See Order Awarding 
Attorney's Fees, p. 2, R. at 2243-2244.) This Order was made 
in accordance with the rule that attorney's fees are awardable 
only if provided by statute or a contract, since attorney's 
fees were not recoverable at common law. Golden Key Realty, 
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); C.G. Horman Co. v. 
Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 112, 499 P.2d 124 (1972). 
Plaintiff cannot recover the amount it paid for the 
Armitage plaintiffs' legal fees ($190,647.31), because those 
fees derive from a claim which is expressly excluded from bond 
coverage by the securities trading rider of the Bond. (See 
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Point IV, above)• The Bond excludes coverage for losses which 
are "directly or indirectly" connected with the trading of 
securities. Id. In the case of Hepler v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 239 S.2d 669 (La. Ct. App. 1970), the court 
interpreted the trading exclusion rider in a bond identical in 
all material respects to the Aetna Bond. The court held that 
the insured could not recover expenses and attorney fees it 
incurred in defense of an action based on an employee's 
wrongful trading activities. Id. at 677. Therefore, the 
award against Home Sctvings of the Armitage plaintiffs' 
attorneys' fees under the Utah securities law, U.C.A. 
§ 61-1-22(1)(b), cannot be recovered under the Bond. 
The other basis for awarding the Armitage 
plaintiffs' legal fees was Home Savings' violation of the 
statutory truth-in-lending laws. (R. at 2243-2244.) See 15 
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3); and U.C.A. § 70B-5-203(1)(c). But under 
Insuring Agreement A, and Rider SR 6041, Aetna's bond covers 
only losses due to "dishonest or fraudulent acts," i.e., the 
type of wrong which is malum in se. 
Under the common law, a crime consisted of 
two elements, an evil intention and an 
unlawful act (malum in se). Malum 
in s^e crimes usually fall into two 
classifications: (1) those such as theft 
and fraud, which require a specific intent 
to commit, and (2) offenses such as rape, 
which require no specific intent to commit 
the offense. 
State v. Jones, 242 Kan. 385, 748 P.2d 839, 844 (1988). 
In contrast, truth-in-lending laws cover conduct 
which is malum prohibitum, that is wrong because it is 
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prohibited, not because it is inherently immoral or improper. 
State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571, 574 (1965) 
("[failure to file a tax return] is an offense malum 
prohibitum, a wrong because it is made so by statute, and 
thus of a character not generally considered to be inherently 
evil, as in the case of offenses which are malum in se.") 
The technical and statutory aspect of 
truth-in-lending violations is reflected in Jury Instruction 
No. 13.01 which was given in the Armitage case. (Document 
Addendum K.) As a statutory or malum prohibitum type of 
infraction, any liability imposed on plaintiff as a result of 
its violations of truth-in-lending law is not the type of loss 
contemplated by the parties in entering into the fidelity bond, 
and it is therefore not covered. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented in this case 
demonstrates that the truth-in-lending violation was caused by 
Home Savings' loan officer, Elaine Reese. It was she who was 
in charge of preparing closing documents and arranging for 
closings. (E. Reese test.; R. at 2903.121.) It was she who 
back-dated the loan documents in order to expedite AFCO's 
receipt of its investors1 funds. (E. Reese test.; R. at 
2903.150.) Thus, any violation of the truth-in-lending statute 
was not a loss caused by the conduct of Larry Glad. 
Prior to the trial, Home Savings had made general 
allegations of employee dishonesty which were not restricted to 
Larry Glad. In the Pretrial Order, Home Savings restricted 
itself to losses covered only by Larry Glad. (R. at 721.) In 
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addition, during the conferences with the Court to draft Jury 
Instructions and prepare Special Verdict forms and Special 
Interrogatories, plaintiff's counsel limited its claims 
expressly to the conduct of Larry Glad and rejected any 
inclusion of Elaine Reese as a source of dishonest or 
fraudulent conduct which caused its loss. Therefore, the fees 
awarded against plaintiff under the truth-in-lending laws do 
not constitute a covered loss. The judgment should be reduced 
by $190,647.31. 
B. Home Sayings' Costs and Fees in Defending the Armitage 
Litigation. 
Home Savings and Aetna have stipulated that 
$437,500.00 was Home Savings' reasonable cost of defending 
the Armitage lawsuit and initiating an appeal from the 
adverse judgment. (See Stipulation of November 2, 1988; R. at 
3850-3853.) However, defendant Aetna reserved the issue of 
whether Home Savings is entitled to those fees at all in 
defending a liability which falls outside the terms and period 
of the Aetna Bond. Id. 
General Agreement C of the Bond states that the 
insured is indemnified for "court costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred . . . on account of any loss, claim or 
damage which, if established against the Insured, would 
constitute a valid and collectible loss sustained by the 
Insured under the terms of this bond." Because of the trading 
exclusion (Rider SR 6030a; see Point IV, above) and the fact 
that the loss was discovered long before the Bond went into 
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effect (Preamble, and Rider 6091; see Point II, above), the 
Armitage defense could not "constitute a valid and 
collectible loss sustained by the Insured under this bond." 
Therefore, the attorneys' fees and costs of defense should not 
be allowed. 
An indemnitee under a bond is bound by the 
determinations of a former adverse judgment, as it reflects on 
the issue of coverage, particularly where the indemnitee puts 
the former judgment into evidence in an action against its 
indemnitor. 11 Couch on Insurance 2d § 44:9 pp. 196-97 
(1982). Home Savings put the Armitage judgment into evidence 
both as Exhibit "B" to its Amended Complaint, and as Trial 
Exhibit 343. That judgment was for multiple securities 
claims. The only one of seven causes of action in Armitage 
falling within the terms of the Bond's coverage was common law 
fraud. Accordingly, Home Savings is entitled to recover only 
those court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in 
defending against that claim. See, i.e., Waite v. Aetna 
Casualty and Sur. Co., 77 Wash. 2d 850, 467 P.2d 847 (1970) 
(damages and attorney's fees apportioned between claims covered 
and not covered by insurance policy). 
In Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & 
Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1981) the court dealt 
with an apportionment problem similar to the one faced in the 
present case. That case involved a bank's failure, in part, 
because a number of the bank's borrowers were unable to repay 
their loans. Many of the bad loans had been granted only after 
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the bank's president and chairman of the board personally 
received "loan fees" or other benefits in exchange for 
approving the loans. Id. at 935. The bank's depositors lost 
money and sought recourse through recovery on the bank's 
fidelity bond. The Ninth Circuit held that "only that 
proportion of loss arising from the nonpayment of dishonest 
loans should be attributed to dishonesty and thus [be] 
recoverable under the [bank's fidelity] bond." Id. at 936. 
In so holding, that court adopted the district court's "logical 
and equitable apportionment between dishonesty and other 
factors" which caused the bank to fail. See Fidelity 
Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp., 440 
F.Supp. 862, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd 647 F.2d 933. 
Similarly, in Biundo v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 
1297 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held that recovery of 
attorney's fees may not exceed the amount attributable to the 
attorney's efforts to obtain payment due under an insurance 
contract, and that an insured may not collect attorney's fees 
incurred in pursuit of a claim for damages not covered by the 
policy. 
Under this state of the law,and in light of the 
language of Aetna's Bond, plaintiff's $437,500.00 of defense 
costs should be denied. If allowed at all, they should only be 
in an amount equivalent to the expense of defending the common 
law fraud claim in the Armitage case. At most, Home Savings 
should recover only one seventh ($62,500.00) of its defense 
costs under General Agreement C of the Bond. 
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CONCLUSION 
Home Savings was not entitled to coverage under the 
Aetna Bond for sound and equitable reasons, which are 
reinforced by applicable case law. The timing of Home Savings1 
purchase of the Aetna Bond on July 14, 1982, in relation to the 
occurrence of events from November 1981 to January 1982, giving 
rise to Home Savings1 ultimate loss, together with Home 
Savings1 "discovery" of those facts during a period through 
June 4, 1982, is the primary thrust of Aetna's defenses. Aetna 
made every reasonable effort to present those defenses to the 
jury, but the trial court refused to allow the jury to decide 
most of those issues. The jury's findings in Aetna's favor on 
the Bond application process and on Home Savings' learning of 
Larry Glad's dishonesty seven months before Home Savings' 
purchase of the Aetna Bond, were disregarded by the trial court 
in entering its judgment. 
Given the facts of this case, the Bond should be 
rescinded because Home Savings made misrepresentations and 
nondisclosures of material facts to Aetna in the Bond 
application process. If the Bond is given effect, then it was 
void ab initio as to Larry Glad because of Home Savings' 
prior knowledge of Larry Glad's dishonesty, and it was void 
ab initio as to losses on the AFCO investor loans because 
Home Savings' "discovery" of loss on those loans occurred prior 
to the Bond period. These results are equitable in particular 
because Home Savings had an identical Bond in place through 
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Fidelity & Deposit up through the time that the Aetna Bond took 
effect. 
The trial court further erred by failing to present 
to the jury Aetna's primary factual defense of mismanagement 
and bad business judgment as an alternative cause for Home 
Savings' loss. In addition, the Bond's trading exclusion Rider 
excludes coverage for losses from trading insecurities because 
Aetna did not contemplate and Home Savings did not purchase 
coverage for this type of special risk. The award of attorney 
fees as an element of damages should be adjusted accordingly. 
Finally, and in the alternative, any award of damages to Home 
Savings should be reduced to the extent of Home Savings' 
benefit from proceeds it received directly from the AFCO 
investor loans. 
Aetna does not challenge the jury's very limited 
factual finding in Home Savings' favor on the Special Verdict. 
However, Aetna does challenge the trial court's disregarding of 
the jury's findings in Aetna's favor in the Special 
Interrogatories. Aetna also challenges the trial court's 
ruling on many important issues as a matter of law and its 
refusal to present those potentially dispositive issues to the 
jury. Ultimately, the jury intended Aetna to prevail, and it 
attempted to find accordingly; but it believed that after four 
and one-half weeks of trial, the case had been taken away from 
it by the trial court. That perception is accurate. 
Aetna requests the following relief: (1) if this 
Court finds in Aetna's favor on Points I, II or III, this Court 
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should direct entry of judgment in Aetna's favor, no cause of 
action; (2) if this Court finds in Aetna's favor on Points IV, 
V, or VI, this case should be remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings and retrial; and (3) if the Court finds in 
Aetna's favor on Points VII or VIII, the trial court should be 
directed to reduce the amount of judgment. 
DATED this go ~ day of December, 1989. 
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